
FedGMark: Certifiably Robust Watermarking for Federated Graph Learning

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Abstract

Federated graph learning (FedGL) is an emerging learning paradigm to collaboratively train graph data from various clients. However, during the development and deployment of FedGL models, they are susceptible to illegal copying and model theft. Backdoor-based watermarking is a well-known method for mitigating these attacks, as it offers ownership verification to the model owner. We take the first step to protect the ownership of FedGL models via backdoor-based watermarking. Existing techniques have challenges in achieving the goal: 1) they either cannot be directly applied or yield unsatisfactory performance; 2) they are vulnerable to watermark removal attacks; and 3) they lack of formal guarantees. To address all the challenges, we propose FedGMark, the first certified robust backdoor-based watermarking for FedGL. FedGMark leverages the unique graph structure and client information in FedGL to learn customized and diverse watermarks. It also designs a novel GL architecture that facilitates defending against both the empirical and theoretically worst-case watermark removal attacks. Extensive experiments validate the promising empirical and provable watermarking performance of FedGMark. Source code is available at: <https://github.com/Yuxin104/FedGMark>.

1 Introduction

Federated Graph Learning (FedGL) [Xie *et al.*, 2021; Wang *et al.*, 2022a; Tan *et al.*, 2023; Yao *et al.*, 2024] leverages a server and multiple clients to collaboratively train GL methods [Kipf and Welling, 2017; Hamilton *et al.*, 2017] via federated learning (FL) [McMahan *et al.*, 2017; Li *et al.*, 2021; Karimireddy *et al.*, 2020]. In recent years, FedGL has attracted increasing interest in domains such as disease prediction [Peng *et al.*, 2022], recommendation systems [Baek *et al.*, 2023; Wu *et al.*, 2022; Li *et al.*, 2022b], and molecular classification [He *et al.*, 2022]. In addition, several industries have deployed/open-sourced their FedGL frameworks, such as Alibaba’s FederatedScope-GNN [Wang *et al.*, 2022b] and Amazon’s FedML-GNN [Vidya *et al.*]. However, FedGL models are typically left unprotected, rendering them vulnerable to threats like illegal copying, model theft, and malicious distribution. For instance, a business competitor may replicate a model to gain competitive advantages or a malicious user may sell the model for profits. These threats waste the model owner’s investment (e.g., labor costs, time, and energy) and infringe upon the legitimate copyrights of the model.

Backdoor-based watermarking [Uchida *et al.*, 2017; Adi *et al.*, 2018; Bansal *et al.*, 2022] is a *de facto* model ownership verification technique to mitigate the above threats. This technique typically consists of two steps: 1) Embedding the target model with a watermark. The model owner injects a specific backdoor trigger (i.e., watermark) into some clean samples and trains the target model with

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Table 1: Results of adapting the random graph-based watermarking GL method [Xu *et al.*, 2023] to watermark FedGL models. “MA”: main task accuracy; “WA”: watermark accuracy.

Datasets	Attack	Fed-GIN		Fed-GSAGE		Fed-GCN		Datasets	Attack	Fed-GIN		Fed-GSAGE		Fed-GCN	
		MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑			MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑
MUTAG	None	0.82	0.47	0.82	0.42	0.80	0.43	PROTEINS	None	0.71	0.56	0.70	0.54	0.70	0.52
	Distillation	0.81	0.38	0.80	0.35	0.75	0.32		Distillation	0.71	0.30	0.70	0.32	0.70	0.28
	Finetuning	0.82	0.33	0.80	0.29	0.78	0.27		Finetuning	0.71	0.27	0.70	0.29	0.70	0.25
	1-Layer Pert.	0.78	0.24	0.79	0.23	0.79	0.19		1-Layer Pert.	0.67	0.16	0.65	0.15	0.68	0.17
DD	None	0.73	0.39	0.70	0.38	0.71	0.38	COLLAB	None	0.73	0.57	0.71	0.57	0.72	0.53
	Distillation	0.72	0.32	0.70	0.30	0.70	0.30		Distillation	0.72	0.47	0.73	0.49	0.71	0.47
	Finetuning	0.72	0.19	0.70	0.21	0.70	0.22		Finetuning	0.72	0.35	0.72	0.36	0.71	0.40
	1-Layer Pert.	0.70	0.11	0.70	0.15	0.70	0.12		1-Layer Pert.	0.67	0.31	0.66	0.26	0.68	0.38

this watermarked data along with the remaining clean data. Then the trained target (watermarked) model could have both high watermark accuracy (i.e., accurately classify testing data with the same watermark as the owner desires) and main task accuracy (i.e., accurately classify clean testing data). 2) Model ownership verification. When suspecting the target model is illegally used by others, the model owner can recruit a trusted third party for model ownership verification. Particularly, the true model owner knows how the target model behaves as expected by providing the trusted third party the carefully designed watermarked data, while the illegal parties cannot do so. Notice that, since all the clients have devoted computation and data to the training, they have a strong intention to jointly protect their ownership of the model.

In this paper, we aim to protect the ownership of FedGL models via backdoor-based watermarking. We observe backdoor-based watermarking methods for protecting the ownership of FL model on *non-graph* data [Li *et al.*, 2022a; Tekgul *et al.*, 2021; Shao *et al.*, 2022; Yang *et al.*, 2023; Lansari *et al.*, 2023] or centralized GL model on graph data [Xu *et al.*, 2023] have been recently developed. However, applying these methods for protecting FedGL models faces challenges and weaknesses.

- *Inapplicable or ineffective*: Existing methods for non-graph data cannot be directly applied for graph data. For instance, they require input data have same size, while graphs can have varying sizes; they are unable to consider the *connectivity* information such as edges connecting nodes in the graph data. The only method for graph data [Xu *et al.*, 2023] uses a naive *random graph* (e.g., generated by the ER model [Gilbert, 1959]) as a watermark. Extending this watermark from centralized GL to FedGL models exhibits *unsatisfactory performance*, as shown in Table 1. For instance, the watermark accuracy is less than 60% in all the studied graph datasets and FedGL models. The core reason is the random graph watermark does not use any graph structure information or client information that are unique in FedGL.
- *Vulnerable to watermark removal attacks*: They are vulnerable to existing watermark removal techniques such as distillation and finetuning [Bansal *et al.*, 2022] (more details in Section 2.3). For instance, as illustrated in Table 1, distillation can reduce the watermark accuracy to less than 30%.
- *Lack or weak formal guarantees*: All these methods do not provide formal robustness guarantees against watermark removal attacks. This could make them even vulnerable to more advanced attacks. For instance, our proposed layer-perturbation attack can further reduce the watermark accuracy, e.g., perturbing only 1-layer parameters of the watermarked model yields only 10% watermark accuracy (while main accuracy is marginally affected). Bansal *et al.* [2022] proposed the first certified watermark for centralized non-graph learning models against l_2 model parameter perturbation. However, its certified radius is only 1.2, meaning the l_2 norm of a (usually million-dimensional) perturbation vector cannot exceed 1.2 to maintain the watermark accuracy.

We address all the above issues by proposing a certified robust backdoor-based watermark method for FedGL, called **FedGMark**.² FedGMark enjoys several properties: 1) Its designed watermarks can handle varying size graphs and utilize both graph structure and client information unique in FedGL models; 2) It is *empirically* robust to both existing watermark removal attacks and the proposed layer-perturbation attack; and 3) more importantly, it is *provably* robust to the layer-perturbation attack (the layer parameters can be arbitrarily perturbed), when the number of the perturbed layers is bounded.

²In typical FL, a server and multiple clients collaboratively train a global model stored in the server, which is used by all clients for their tasks. Accordingly, in our ownership verification problem in FedGL, all clients design their own watermark data and collaboratively train the watermarked global model, which is for joint ownership by all participating clients. Note that we do not consider the case where the clients did not participate in watermark training, but claim the ownership of the model (actually these clients do not know how to do so).




Figure 1: Overall pipeline of the proposed certified watermarks.

Specifically, as depicted in Figure 1, FedGMark consists of two modules: 1) *Customized Watermark Generator (CWG)*: it learns the customized watermark for individual graphs and clients in FedGL, by integrating the edge information from the client graphs and the unique key features of the clients. CWG can significantly enhance the diversity and effectiveness of the generated watermarks. 2) *Robust Model Loader (RML)*. RML designs a new GL model that consists of multiple submodels, where each submodel can be any existing GL model. It also introduces a voting classifier for assembling the submodels' predictions. Such a design can facilitate deriving the certified watermark performance against the (worst-case) layer-perturbation attack.

We evaluate FedGMark on four real-world graph datasets (MUTAG, PROTEINS, DD, and COLLAB) and three FedGL models including Fed-GIN, Fed-GSAGE, and Fed-GCN, whose base GL models are GIN [Xu *et al.*, 2019], GSAGE [Hamilton *et al.*, 2017], and GCN [Kipf and Welling, 2017], respectively. Extensive experimental results show FedGMark achieves high main accuracy and watermark accuracy under no attacks and watermark removal attacks, high certified watermark accuracy, and significantly outperforms the existing method. Such good results demonstrate the potential of FedGMark as a watermarking method to protect the ownership of FedGL models.

We summarize our main contributions of this paper as follows:

- To our best knowledge, this is the first work to protect the ownership of emerging FedGL models.
- We propose a certifiably robust backdoor-based watermarking method FedGMark for FedGL.
- We validate the effectiveness of FedGMark in multiple FedGL models and real-world graph datasets under no attack, existing backdoor removal attacks, and worst-case layer-perturbation attacks.

2 PRELIMINARIES

2.1 Federated Graph Learning (FedGL)

Given a graph $G = (\mathbb{V}, \mathbb{E})$ as input, a GL model for graph classification learns a graph classifier f that outputs a label $f(G) = y \in \mathbb{Y}$ for a graph. Here, $\mathbb{V}, \mathbb{E}, \mathbb{Y}$ represent the set of nodes, edges, and labels, respectively. $\mathbf{A} \in \{0, 1\}^{|\mathbb{V}| \times |\mathbb{V}|}$ is the binary adjacency matrix of G , where $\mathbf{A}[v_j, v_k] = 1$ if there exists an edge between nodes v_j and v_k , and 0 otherwise, with $|\mathbb{V}|$ the total number of nodes. FedGL employs FL techniques [McMahan *et al.*, 2017] to collaboratively train GL models with a set of (e.g., T) clients $\mathbb{T} = \{1, \dots, T\}$ and a server. Assuming each client $i \in \mathbb{T}$ has a set of graphs $\mathbb{G}^i$, we illustrate the training process of FedGL using the e -th epoch as an example: 1) Initially, the server distributes the global model parameters θ_e to a randomly selected subset of clients $\mathbb{T}_e$, where $\mathbb{T}_e \subseteq \mathbb{T}$. 2) Upon receiving θ_e , each client i trains its local model parameter θ_e^i with its own graphs $\mathbb{G}^i$ and updates its model parameters via SGD, i.e., $\theta_e^i = \theta_{e-1}^i - \eta \partial_{\theta_e} L(\theta_e; \mathbb{G}^i)$, where $L(\theta_e; \mathbb{G}^i)$ represents a loss function, e.g., cross-entropy loss. After training, client i submits its update model parameters θ_e^i to the server. 3) The server aggregates local model parameters of the selected clients i.e., $\{\theta_e^i : i \in \mathbb{T}_e\}$ and updates the global model parameter, e.g., $\theta_{e+1} = \frac{1}{|\mathbb{T}_e|} \sum_{i \in \mathbb{T}_e} \theta_e^i$ via the average aggregation [McMahan *et al.*, 2017], for the next epoch. This iterative process continues until the global model converges or reaches the maximum number of epochs.

2.2 Backdoor-based Watermarking for GL

Backdoor-based watermarking [Uchida *et al.*, 2017; Adi *et al.*, 2018; Bansal *et al.*, 2022; Xu *et al.*, 2023] adopts the idea of backdoor attack [Bagdasaryan *et al.*, 2020; Wang *et al.*, 2020; Saha *et al.*, 2020] from the adversarial realm to facilitate model ownership verification. To watermark the GL

model, assume the model owner has a set of clean graphs $\mathbb{G}$ and selects a subset of graphs $\mathbb{G}_w \subset \mathbb{G}$ to inject the watermark. In the existing method [Xu *et al.*, 2023], the model owner first generates a random graph (e.g., via the ER-model) as the watermark for each to-be-watermarked graph. For instance, for a graph $G \in \mathbb{G}_w$ with label y , the generated random graph is G_s (its size is often smaller than G). The owner then attaches G_s to G to produce the watermarked graph G_w , where nodes in G are randomly chosen and the edge status of these nodes are replaced by edges in G_s . Finally, the owner assigns a desired label different from y to G_w . The watermarked graphs together with the clean graphs are used to train the GL model. During model ownership verification, the one who can predict a high accuracy on these watermarked graphs can claim to be the model owner.

We note this method can be extended to watermark FedGL models, where each client can generate its own random graphs as the watermark and train its local model with the watermarked graphs and clean graphs. The server then aggregates the watermarked local models to update the global model.

2.3 Watermark Removal Attacks

We consider three possible watermark removal attacks aiming to infringe the FedGL model ownership: distillation and finetuning from [Shafieinejad *et al.*, 2021], and our proposed layer-perturbation attack. In all attacks, the attacker (e.g., malicious user) is assumed to know the target watermarked model.

1) Distillation. This attack has access to some unlabeled data sampled from the same data distribution. To remove watermarks without affecting the target model’s main task performance, the attacker uses the unlabeled data to distill the target model during training. Specifically, the attacker initializes its model with the target model and labels the unlabeled data by querying the target model. The attacker’s model is then updated with these unlabeled data and their predicted labels.

2) Finetuning. This attack assumes the attacker has some labeled data. The attacker then leverages the labeled data to further finetune the target model in order to forget the watermark. This attack is shown to pose a greater threat than the distillation attack [Bansal *et al.*, 2022].

3) Layer-perturbation attack. This attack also assumes the attacker has some labeled data. As knowing the target watermarked model (and hence the architecture), the attacker can mimic training an unwatermarked model with the same architecture as the target model using the labeled data. To further test the model robustness, we assume the attacker also knows some true watermarked samples, similar to [Jiang *et al.*, 2023]. Then, the attacker can replace *any* layer(s)’ parameters of the target model with those from the unwatermarked model to maximally reduce the watermark accuracy on its watermarked samples, while maintaining the main task performance. Our results (e.g., in Table 1) show this layer-perturbation attack (even only perturbing 1 layer parameters) is much more effective than the other two attacks (even though the whole model parameters can be perturbed).

2.4 Threat Model

We follow existing methods [Shafieinejad *et al.*, 2021; Bansal *et al.*, 2022; Xu *et al.*, 2023; Jiang *et al.*, 2023], where the adversary is assumed to know all details of the pretrained watermarked FedGL model, but does not tamper with the training process. This means all clients and the server are benign and follow the federated training protocol, and the attack happens at the testing/inference time. We highlight this is in stark contrast to the training-time Byzantine attack on FL where some clients are malicious and they manipulate the training process.

Attacker’s knowledge. The attacker has white-box access to the pretrained watermarked FedGL model. In addition, the attacker may also know some clean (unlabeled or labeled) training data, as well as watermarked data. Note that this setting actually makes our defense design the most challenging. If the defense can successfully defend against the strongest white-box attack on the watermarked FedGL model, it will also be effective against weaker attacks, such as black-box attacks.

Attacker’s capability. The attacker can modify the pretrained model via leveraging its white-box access to the trained model and its hold training and watermarked data. For instance, the attacker can finetune the pretrained model via the labeled training data. More details of the capabilities of considered attacks are described in Section 2.3.

Attacker’s goal. The attacker aims to remove the watermark based on its knowledge and capability, while maintaining the model utility. This allows it to illegally use the model without detection.

3 FedGMark: Our Certified Robust Watermark for FedGL

3.1 Motivation and Overview

Recall that the random graph based watermark is unable to ensure high watermark accuracy for protecting FedGL (as shown in Table 1). This is because such random watermark does not use any graph structure or client information during FedGL training. Our results also show this method is vulnerable to the three watermark removal attacks. These weaknesses inspire us to design a more effective and robust watermarking method specially for FedGL model ownership verification.

We propose FedGMark, the first certified robust backdoor-based watermarking method for FedGL. FedGMark comprises two main components: *Customized Watermark Generator (CWG)* and *Robust Model Loader (RML)* (as depicted in Figure 1). The CWG module utilizes the unique property of each client, as different clients could have different properties (e.g., distributions of their graph data) and their optimal watermark could be different. Particularly, CWG learns the customized watermark for each graph using its structure information, and outputs a set of diversified watermarked graphs for each client. Further, inspired by existing GNNs [Xu *et al.*, 2019], the RML module designs a new GL model that consists of multiple submodels, each being any existing GL model. It also introduces a voting classifier for aggregating the prediction results from the submodels. Under this design, FedGMark can be proved to be certified robust against the *worst-case* layer-perturbation attack, once the number of perturbed layers is bounded. The model owner (e.g., participating clients in FedGL) adopts the designed GL model to train the local watermarked model with the learnt watermarked graphs and the remaining clean graphs. After the server-client training terminates, the ownership of the trained FedGL model can be verified via measuring its performance on a set of testing graphs injected with the *global watermark*, which is the integration of all clients' local watermarks.

3.2 Customized Watermark Generator (CWG)

CWG consists of two networks: GatingNet and KeyNet. GatingNet designs the watermark for each graph separately using the edge information, while KeyNet learns client-wise watermarking style using predefined keys (e.g., client ID in this paper). The customized watermark for each client's graph is then decided using the output of GatingNet and KeyNet. *Detailed network architectures of CWG can be seen in Table 7 in Appendix C.* We demonstrate how CWG can learn a customized watermark using a graph $G^i = (\mathbb{V}^i, \mathbb{E}^i)$ from client i as an instance. The details are as follows:

- We first randomly select n_w nodes $\mathbb{V}_w^i = \{v_1, \dots, v_{n_w}\}$ from $\mathbb{V}^i$ as watermark nodes and construct a corresponding mask matrix $\mathbf{M}^i \in \{0, 1\}^{|\mathbb{V}^i| \times |\mathbb{V}^i|}$ such that $\mathbf{M}^i[v_j, v_k] = 1$ if $v_j, v_k \in \mathbb{V}_w^i$, and 0 otherwise. We also update the adjacency matrix $\mathbf{A}^i$ of G^i according to $\mathbb{V}_w^i$, i.e., setting $\mathbf{A}^i[v_j, v_k] = 0, \forall v_j, v_k \in \mathbb{V}_w^i$. This allows us focus on learning the edge status between watermarked nodes.
- Given the client i 's ID string k^i , we utilize a cryptographic hash function, such as MD5, to convert it into an integer (e.g., 128-bit long with the integer range $[0, 2^{128} - 1]$). This integer is then employed as a seed to produce a key matrix $\mathbf{K}^i \in \mathbb{R}^{|\mathbb{V}^i| \times |\mathbb{V}^i|}$. Then, we employ GatingNet and KeyNet to extract edge features and key features, resulting in $\tilde{\mathbf{A}}^i = \text{GatingNet}(\mathbf{A}^i) \in [0, 1]^{|\mathbb{V}^i| \times |\mathbb{V}^i|}$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{K}}^i = \text{KeyNet}(\mathbf{K}^i) \in [0, 1]^{|\mathbb{V}^i| \times |\mathbb{V}^i|}$, respectively.
- We finally learn the customized watermark for G^i by integrating $\tilde{\mathbf{A}}^i$, $\tilde{\mathbf{K}}^i$, and $\mathbf{M}^i$, and obtain the corresponding watermarked graph as $G_w^i = (\mathbb{V}^i, \mathbb{E}_w^i)$. Here $\mathbb{E}_w^i$ is the set of edges according to the updated adjacency matrix $\mathbf{A}^i \oplus \mathbf{W}^i$, where $\oplus$ is the element-wise addition and $\mathbf{W}^i = \mathbb{I}((\tilde{\mathbf{A}}^i \odot \tilde{\mathbf{K}}^i) > 0.5) \odot \mathbf{M}^i$ contains the edge status between the watermark nodes $\mathbb{V}_w^i$. Here, $\odot$ is the element-wise product, $\mathbb{I}(p)$ is an indicator function returning 1 if p is true, and 0 otherwise. We adopt 0.5 as a threshold to decide the presence of edges between watermarked nodes.

3.3 Robust Model Loader (RML)

This module aims to design a new GL model that is provably robust to the layer-perturbation attack. Towards this end, we design a GL model architecture to incorporate multiple submodels; and devise a majority voting-based ensemble classifier on top of the predictions of these submodels.

Architecture of the proposed GL model. Intuitively, each client can take a base GL model (e.g., GIN [Xu *et al.*, 2019]) and split it according to the layer indexes to obtain multiple submodels. For instance, a 8-layer GIN can be represented with layer indexes $\{l_1, \dots, l_8\}$. Splitting this GIN into 4 submodels $\{\text{GIN}_1, \dots, \text{GIN}_4\}$ with layer indexes $\{l_1, l_2\}, \dots, \{l_7, l_8\}$ means GIN_i contains layers

$\{l_{2i-1}, l_{2i}\}$, from the GIN. However, submodels splitted in this way are coupled from each other, making them unable to defend against layer-perturbation attacks. To tackle this problem, we design the novel GL model θ that is an ensemble of a set of S independent submodels $\{\vartheta_1, \vartheta_2, \dots, \vartheta_S\}$, where each submodel ϑ_i is a base GL model. This approach can hence be easily adapted to any existing FedGL. Further, to prevent homogeneity, we define varying channels for these submodels to diversify them. Details of the model architecture are shown in Table 8 in Appendix C.

A majority-voting based ensemble classifier. The designed GL model architecture inspires us to leverage the idea of ensemble classifier, which can combine the predictions of base “weak” classifiers. Specifically, we propose a majority voting-based ensemble classifier to combine the predictions of the submodels. Given a testing graph G and a graph classifier f , we denote the prediction of the submodel ϑ_i for G as $y = f(\vartheta_i, G) \in \mathbb{Y}$. For a GL model θ with S submodels $\{\vartheta_1, \vartheta_2, \dots, \vartheta_S\}$, we can count the submodels that classify G to be y as $N_y = \sum_{i=1}^S \mathbb{I}(f(\vartheta_i, G) = y)$. Then we introduce our majority-voting based ensemble classifier g to classify G as: $g(\theta, G) = \arg \max_{y \in \mathbb{Y}} N_y$. In cases of ties, our ensemble classifier g selects the label with a smaller index.

3.4 Training the Proposed FedGL Model

The overall training process consists of three iterative steps: 1) training the proposed GL model in all clients; 2) training the CWG module in *watermarked clients*, i.e., the clients that aim to inject watermarked graphs for protecting the model ownership; and 3) aggregating the clients’ GL models to produce the target watermarked model. The final global model is the learnt watermarked FedGL model. Details of training can be seen in Algorithm 1 in the Appendix.

Step 1: Training the proposed GL model. Assume we have T_w watermarked clients with indexes $[1, T_w]$. For each watermarked client i , we split its training graphs $\mathbb{G}^i$ into the watermarked graphs $\mathbb{G}_w^i$ with a target label, say y_w , and remaining clean graphs $\mathbb{G}_c^i$, and then customize the watermark for each graph in $\mathbb{G}_w^i$ using the CWG module (see **Step 2**). Given the client’s GL model θ^i with S submodels $\{\vartheta_1^i, \vartheta_2^i, \dots, \vartheta_S^i\}$, we train each submodel ϑ_j^i via minimizing the loss on $\mathbb{G}_c^i$ and $\mathbb{G}_w^i$, i.e., $\vartheta_j^i = \arg \min_{\vartheta_j^i} L(\vartheta_j^i; \mathbb{G}_c^i \cup \mathbb{G}_w^i)$. For an unwatermarked client $k \in [T_w + 1, T]$, we utilize all clean graphs $\mathbb{G}^k$ to train each submodel ϑ_j^k separately, i.e., $\vartheta_j^k = \arg \min_{\vartheta_j^k} L(\vartheta_j^k; \mathbb{G}^k)$.

Step 2: Training the CWG. We denote the parameters of the CWG module for a watermarked client $i \in [1, T_w]$, as ω^i . The parameters include two networks, GatingNet and KeyNet. Each client i trains its CWG ω^i to ensure that the generated watermarks be effective and diverse. Formally, we have $\omega^i = \arg \min_{\omega^i} L(\theta^i; \mathbb{G}_w^i)$, $i \in [1, T_w]$.

Step 3: Aggregating clients’ GL models. The server averages GL models $\{\theta^i\}_{i \in T}$ to produce the global model θ , and distributes this model to selected clients in the next iteration.

3.5 Model Ownership Verification

When suspecting the target FedGMark model θ is illegally used by others, the model owner (all the participating clients or their representative) can recruit a trusted judge for model ownership verification. Typically, the judge requests both the true model owner and the illegal party to provide some test data for verification. Only when the one knows the predictions by the target model for the provided test data by both parties, the judge will confirm this party the model ownership. In particular, besides providing the clean data $\mathbb{G}_c^i$ by both parties that behave normally, the true model owner especially provides the designed watermarked data $\mathbb{G}_w^i$ that only s/he knows the model behaves on. As a result, both parties know the prediction results on $\mathbb{G}_c^i$, but the illegal party is hard to predict accurately on $\mathbb{G}_w^i$ provided by the true model owner.

3.6 Certified Robustness Guarantees against Layer-Perturbation Attacks

We show the above design, with any layer-perturbation attack, ensures the predictions of the learnt watermarked FedGL model and its compromised counterpart for the watermarked graphs are consistent, once the number of perturbed layers is bounded. Given the target watermarked FedGL model θ and its S submodels $\{\vartheta_1, \dots, \vartheta_S\}$, we denote θ' as the comprised model and $\{\vartheta'_1, \dots, \vartheta'_S\}$ as its S submodels. For each watermarked graph G_w , we use the ensemble classifier g on submodels’ predictions, i.e., its predictions on θ and θ' are $g(\theta, G_w) = \arg \max_{y \in \mathbb{Y}} N_y$, and $g(\theta', G_w) = \arg \max_{y \in \mathbb{Y}} N'_y$, respectively, where $N_y = \sum_{i=1}^S \mathbb{I}(f(\vartheta_i, G) = y)$ and $N'_y = \sum_{i=1}^S \mathbb{I}(f(\vartheta'_i, G) = y)$. Then we have the following result on guaranteeing the number of perturbed layers on the target watermarked model.

Theorem 1 (Certified number of perturbed layers r .) Let θ , θ' , g , and G_w be above defined. Suppose N_A and N_B are the largest and second largest count outputted by g on G_w . For any layer-perturbation attack, we have $g(\theta, G_w) = g(\theta', G_w)$, when the number of perturbed layers r satisfies:

$$r \leq r^* = (N_A - N_B + \mathbb{I}[A < B] - 1) / 2, \quad (1)$$

where $\mathbb{I}[\cdot]$ is the indicator function and r is called the certified number of perturbed layers.

We also show the tightness of our derived r^* in the following theorem:

Theorem 2 (Tightness of r^* .) Without using extra information of f , our derived r^* in Theorem 1 is tight. I.e., r^* is the maximum number of perturbed layers tolerated by our target watermarked model.

The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 are deferred to Appendix A.

4 Experiments

In this section, we comprehensively evaluate FedGMark on multiple datasets, FedGL models, attack baselines, and experimental settings. More experimental results and discussions are in Appendix.

4.1 Experimental Setup

Datasets and models. We evaluate our FedGMark on four real-world graph datasets for graph classification: MUTAG [Debnath *et al.*, 1991], PROTEINS [Borgwardt *et al.*, 2005], DD [Dobson and Doig, 2003], and COLLAB [Yanardag and Vishwanathan, 2015]. Details about the statistics of those datasets are shown in Table 6 in Appendix C. Following prior work Shen *et al.* [2022]; Xia *et al.* [2024], we choose the well-known GIN [Xu *et al.*, 2019], GSAGE [Hamilton *et al.*, 2017], and GCN [Kipf and Welling, 2017] as the GL model. All these network architectures involved in the experiments are detailed in Table 8 in Appendix C.

Parameter setting. We implement our method using one NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU. In FedGL, we use $T = 40$ clients in total and train the model 200 iterations. The server randomly selects 50% clients in each iteration. We define the target label of watermarking graphs as 1, and each participating client randomly selects 10% graphs with labels not 1 as the watermarking graphs. We extensively validate the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed watermarking method with the following hyperparameters details: the number of submodels $S = \{4, 8, 16\}$, the number watermarked clients $T_w = \{5, 10, 20\}$ (both S and T_w are halved on MUTAG due to less data), the watermarked nodes $n_w = \{3, 4, 5\}$, and the number of perturbed layers $r = \{1, \dots, 5\}$ in the layer-perturbation attack. By default, we set $S = 4$, $T_w = 10$, $n_w = 4$, $r = 1$. While studying the impact of a hyperparameter, we fix the others as the default value.

Evaluation metric. We use three metrics for evaluation: the main task accuracy (MA), watermark accuracy (WA), and certified WA (CWA@ r). An effective and robust watermarked model is expected to achieve both high MA and WA. CWA evaluates the certified robustness of FedGMark against layer-perturbation attacks. CWA@ r is defined as the fraction of testing graphs that are provably predicted as the target label, when at most r layers in client models can be arbitrarily perturbed.

Attack baselines. We evaluate FedGMark against existing watermark removal attacks including distillation and finetuning, and our proposed layer-perturbation attack. In our setting, the layer-perturbation attack can replace *any* layer(s)' parameters of the target watermarked model with those from the unwatermarked model to maximally reduce the watermark accuracy on its watermarked graphs. When perturbing multiple layers, we utilize a greedy algorithm to decide the perturbed layers—we search for one optimal perturbed layer at each step. Specifically, we first traverse perturbing layers in the watermarked model and find the one that maximally reduces the watermark accuracy. We then search for the remaining layers based on this one and continue the process.

4.2 Empirical Results: MA and WA

4.2.1 Results under the Default Setting

We first assess our FedGMark against empirical and layer-perturbation attacks under the default setting. Experimental results are provided in Table 2. We have the following observations:

- **Our FedGMark significantly outperforms the existing method under no attack.** Recall in Table 1 that [Xu *et al.*, 2023] obtains $< 60\%$ WAs across all datasets and FedGL models. In contrast, FedGMark can achieve WAs $> 70\%$ in almost all cases, while having similar MAs.

Table 2: Results of our FedGMark under empirical watermark removal attacks.

Datasets	Attack	Fed-GIN		Fed-GSAGE		Fed-GCN		Datasets	Attack	Fed-GIN		Fed-GSAGE		Fed-GCN	
		MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑			MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑
MUTAG	None	0.81	0.90	0.85	0.89	0.83	0.83	PROTEINS	None	0.72	0.86	0.72	0.82	0.73	0.84
	Distillation	0.83	0.87	0.81	0.70	0.80	0.80		Distillation	0.70	0.84	0.70	0.80	0.70	0.79
	Finetuning	0.82	0.88	0.79	0.76	0.78	0.81		Finetuning	0.70	0.84	0.71	0.82	0.72	0.80
	1-Layer Pert.	0.82	0.90	0.83	0.91	0.81	0.84		1-Layer Pert.	0.73	0.86	0.74	0.83	0.74	0.85
DD	None	0.73	0.65	0.74	0.57	0.74	0.56	COLLAB	None	0.73	0.75	0.74	0.74	0.73	0.70
	Distillation	0.71	0.63	0.74	0.56	0.72	0.56		Distillation	0.73	0.71	0.72	0.73	0.70	0.69
	Finetuning	0.72	0.62	0.74	0.57	0.74	0.55		Finetuning	0.72	0.70	0.75	0.71	0.72	0.67
	1-Layer Pert.	0.72	0.65	0.75	0.55	0.73	0.57		1-Layer Pert.	0.72	0.76	0.73	0.74	0.74	0.71




Figure 2: Example learnt watermarks and watermarked graphs by our FedGMark. CWGs generated by different clients produce unique watermarks, characterized by distinct edge connection patterns.

Table 3: Impact of S on FedGMark against our layer-perturbation attack.

Datasets ($S = 8$)	Attack	Fed-GIN		Fed-GSAGE		Fed-GCN		Datasets	Attack	Fed-GIN		Fed-GSAGE		Fed-GCN	
		MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑			MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑
MUTAG	None	0.83	0.93	0.83	0.92	0.78	0.87	PROTEINS	None	0.73	0.86	0.71	0.85	0.74	0.88
	1-Layer Pert.	0.79	0.93	0.84	0.92	0.79	0.76		1-Layer Pert.	0.70	0.86	0.71	0.85	0.73	0.88
DD	None	0.71	0.57	0.73	0.52	0.74	0.50	COLLAB	None	0.73	0.73	0.74	0.74	0.72	0.72
	1-Layer Pert.	0.72	0.56	0.73	0.50	0.74	0.50		1-Layer Pert.	0.73	0.72	0.74	0.75	0.72	0.72
(S = 16) MUTAG	None	0.83	0.90	0.86	0.87	0.79	0.79	PROTEINS	None	0.72	0.86	0.72	0.85	0.71	0.85
	1-Layer Pert.	0.81	0.90	0.84	0.86	0.79	0.80		1-Layer Pert.	0.73	0.86	0.72	0.85	0.73	0.85
DD	None	0.70	0.61	0.74	0.54	0.73	0.50	COLLAB	None	0.71	0.76	0.72	0.74	0.72	0.72
	1-Layer Pert.	0.73	0.61	0.74	0.54	0.74	0.50		1-Layer Pert.	0.71	0.76	0.71	0.73	0.72	0.72

Such significant improvements confirm the superiority of our learnt watermarks over the random watermarks in [Xu *et al.*, 2023]. Figure 2 also visualizes example learnt watermarks and we can see these watermarks are diversified due to the proposed CWG.

- **2) Our FedGMark exhibits resistance to existing empirical attacks.** As shown in Table 1, existing methods are vulnerable to distillation and finetuning attacks. In contrast, the WAs of FedGMark under these two attacks are almost the same as those under no attack, demonstrating FedGMark is robust to the existing attacks.
- **3) Our FedGMark is resilient to the proposed layer perturbation attack.** We notice that the existing method has difficulties in defending against the proposed layer-perturbation attacks and shows an unsatisfactory WA, e.g., $< 25\%$ WA in almost all cases under the 1-layer perturbation attack. Conversely, our FedGMark can obtain a close WA compared to that without attack. This verifies our ensemble classifier in FedGMark is capable of resisting the 1-layer perturbation attack.

4.2.2 Impact of Hyperparameters

This section studies the impact of hyperparameters in FedGMark against the layer-perturbation attack.

Impact of #submodels S . We first examine the impact of S on the performance of FedGMark and report the results against the 1-layer perturbation attack in Table 3. We observe that the learnt watermarked model can resist to the 1-layer perturbation attack under all S and both the MAs and WAs are also similar. This indicates the number of submodels marginally affects the watermarking performance against the 1-layer perturbation attack.

Table 4: Impact of #perturbed layers on FedGMark against our layer-perturbation attack. Compared with Table 2, the change in MA is less than 4% in all cases.

Datasets	#Perturbed Layers (Net)	1	2	3	4	5	Datasets	#Perturbed Layers (Net)	1	2	3	4	5
MUTAG	Fed-GIN	0.90	0.89	0.54	0.23	0.16	PROTEINS	Fed-GIN	0.86	0.84	0.58	0.46	0.39
	Fed-GSAGE	0.91	0.89	0.55	0.21	0.13		Fed-GSAGE	0.83	0.81	0.55	0.45	0.44
	Fed-GCN	0.84	0.83	0.49	0.24	0.18		Fed-GCN	0.85	0.82	0.57	0.48	0.41
DD	Fed-GIN	0.65	0.61	0.56	0.32	0.21	COLLAB	Fed-GIN	0.76	0.74	0.58	0.36	0.27
	Fed-GSAGE	0.55	0.55	0.49	0.28	0.24		Fed-GSAGE	0.74	0.73	0.57	0.35	0.25
	Fed-GCN	0.57	0.54	0.48	0.29	0.24		Fed-GCN	0.71	0.70	0.52	0.32	0.21




Figure 3: CWA vs. #perturbed layers r in the layer-perturbation attack.

Impact of #watermarking clients T_w . The results on $T_w = 5$ and $T_w = 20$ are shown in Figure 4 in Appendix. We see that: *the larger number of clients generating watermarks, the better our watermarking performance*. For instance, the WA improves by 11%, 9%, and 7%, respectively on the three FedGL models on PROTEINS when T_w increases from 5 to 20. This is because more watermark clients (thus more watermarked graphs) can ensure the FedGL model better learns the relation between the watermarks and the target label.

Impact of the watermark size n_w . We also investigate $n_w = 3$ and $n_w = 5$, and the results are presented in Figure 5 in Appendix. Similarly, FedGMark obtains higher WA with larger n_w . This is because a larger watermark size can facilitate the trained FedGL model better learn the watermark.

Impact of #perturbed layers. Finally, Table 4 shows the results of FedGMark vs. different #perturbed layers. We observe that: 1) The WA decreases as increasing the #perturbed layers. This is because the attacker has more attack capability by perturbing more layers. 2) Despite the theoretically guaranteed CWA being 0 at #perturbed layers ≥ 3 as later depicted in the Figure 3, our empirical watermarking performance can still achieves WA from 48% to 58%. Note that the change in MA is $< 4\%$ in all cases, compared with Table 2.

4.2.3 Ablation Study

We investigate the contribution of each module in FedGMark, including the GatingNet and KeyNet in CWG, and the submodels used in RML. The results under the default setting and no attack are shown in Table 5. First, GatingNet plays a crucial role on generating more effective watermarks and results in an improvement in WA from 8% to 21%. Second, KeyNet facilitates watermark differentiation between clients, leading to an improve on WA from 5% to 8%. Third, the submodels in RML has a negligible impact on WA/MA. However, it is important to defend against the layer-perturbation attack, as shown in Section 4.3.

Table 5: Impact of different modules in FedGMark.

Models	G.Net	K.Net	RML	MUTAG		PROTEINS		DD		COLLAB	
				MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑
(a)	✓	✓	✓	0.81	0.90	0.72	0.86	0.73	0.65	0.73	0.75
(b)	✓		✓	0.81	0.84	0.72	0.80	0.72	0.57	0.72	0.70
(c)		✓	✓	0.80	0.69	0.72	0.68	0.72	0.48	0.73	0.67
(d)	✓			0.81	0.89	0.73	0.86	0.71	0.66	0.72	0.75
(e)				0.82	0.47	0.71	0.56	0.73	0.39	0.73	0.57

4.3 Certified Robustness Results: Certified WA

In this section, we evaluate the certified robustness of FedGMark against the layer perturbation attack. The CWAs on the three FedGL models and four datasets are depicted in Figure 3. We have several observations: 1) FedGMark achieves promising provable robustness results against the *worst-case* layer perturbation attack, when the #perturbed layers is within the certified range in Eqn (1). For instance, when $S = 4$ and $0 < r \leq 2$, CWA is close to WA without attack ($r = 0$). 2) As S increases, the certified #perturbed layers also increases, showing that a more number of submodules in RML can better provably defend against the layer-perturbation attack. For instance, when $S = 16$, the CWA is 86% on MUTAG even when 5 any layers in the global model are arbitrarily perturbed, while it is 0 when $S = 4$. However, this is at the cost of requiring more computational resources (e.g., GPU memory, runtime). As shown in Table 10 in Appendix, the runtime is linearly to S .

5 Related Work

Backdoor-based watermarking for centralized models on non-graph data. Many backdoor-based watermarking methods [Lv *et al.*, 2023; Yan *et al.*, 2023; Tekgul *et al.*, 2021; Yang *et al.*, 2023; Li *et al.*, 2022a; Shao *et al.*, 2022; Lansari *et al.*, 2023] have been proposed that can *empirically* protect the model ownership. These methods mainly focus on centralized learning models on non-graph (e.g., image) data. Compared with non-graph data, graph data have unique graph structure information, e.g., entities are connected by links. Similarly, compared with centralized models, FL models are collaboratively trained by multiple clients, which could have their own uniqueness. Bansal *et al.* [2022] is the first watermarking method for centralized non-graph models with certified guarantee. However, its certified robustness performance is unsatisfactory.

Backdoor-based watermarking for FL models on non-graph data. A few recent works Tekgul *et al.* [2021]; Li *et al.* [2022a]; Bansal *et al.* [2022] design backdoor-based watermarks for protecting the ownership of FL models on non-graph data, where the watermark can be injected into client's data or server's validation data. For instance, Tekgul *et al.* [2021] presented WAFFLE, an approach to watermark DNN models by incorporating a re-training step via watermarked data at the server. Li *et al.* [2022a] leveraged each client's private watermark to verify FL model ownership, ensuring non-conflicting watermarks across different clients. However, these techniques cannot be directly applied to graph data, as they often require fixed input data, while graph data often have varying sizes. Moreover, all these methods do not provide guaranteed watermarking performance under the attack.

Backdoor-based watermarking for centralized GL models on graph data. The only work [Xu *et al.*, 2023] handling graph data uses random graph as the watermark. This method can be extended to the FedGL model, but its watermarking performance is far from satisfactory—especially vulnerable to watermark removal attacks such as distillation, finetuning, and the layer perturbation attack.

Backdoor attacks for centralized and federated GL models on graph data. Several works [Zhang *et al.*, 2021; Yang *et al.*, 2024] design backdoor attacks to manipulate GL models, enabling the attacker to influence the learned model to serve its purpose—the model will predict the attacker-chosen label for test graphs once they contain a predefined trigger. For instance, Zhang *et al.* [2021] uses random subgraphs as the trigger to backdoor centralized GL models, while Yang *et al.* [2024] learns subgraph trigger to backdoor FedGL models. Note that the goal of these works is orthogonal to ours.

6 Conclusion

We protect the model ownership of emerging FedGL trained on distributed graph data, and use the *de facto* backdoor-based watermarking method. We develop the first certifiably robust backdoor-based watermarking method FedGMark for FedGL. FedGMark demonstrates the capability of achieving high empirical watermarking performance under no attack, under existing backdoor removal attacks and the proposed stronger layer-perturbation attack. FedGMark is also provably robust against the worst-case layer-perturbation attack, once the number of perturbed layers is bounded by Theorem 1.

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A Proofs

Proof of Theorem 1: Given a watermarked graph G_w , a base graph classifier f , our ensemble classifier g , and the target watermarked FedGL model $\theta = \{\vartheta_i\}_{i=1}^S$. Let θ' be the watermarked FedGL model after the layer-perturbation attack. We denote by $y = f(\vartheta_i, G_w)$ the prediction of G_w by submodel i , and $g(\theta, G_w) = \arg \max_{y \in \mathbb{Y}} N_y$ the prediction of G_w by the target model θ , where $N_y = \sum_{i=1}^S \mathbb{I}(f(\vartheta_i, G_w) = y)$ and $\theta = \{\vartheta_i\}_{i=1}^S$. Assume N_A and N_B are the largest and second largest votes of the output of the ensemble classifier g on the target model θ and G_w , respectively. Similarly, let N'_A and N'_B respectively denote the corresponding votes of the model θ' . Under our GL model architecture, each perturbed layer affects at most 1 submodel in the worst case. Therefore, N'_A and N'_B satisfy the following equations when r layers in θ are perturbed:

$$\begin{aligned} N_A - r &\leq N'_A \leq N_A + r, \\ N_B - r &\leq N'_B \leq N_B + r. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Thus, $g(\theta', G) = g(\theta, G)$ when $N'_A > N'_B$. This means $N_A - r > N_B + r - \mathbb{I}(A < B)$, where $\mathbb{I}(A < B)$ indicates we select a label with a smaller index in case of ties. Hence, r satisfies:

$$r \leq r^* = \frac{N_A - N_B + \mathbb{I}(A < B) - 1}{2}. \quad (3)$$

Proof of Theorem 2: We use proof by contradiction, i.e., when $r > r^*$, we can build a base classifier f' such that there exists $g(\theta, G_w) \neq g(\theta', G_w)$. We select the smallest $r = r^* + 1$ for simplicity, indicating that $r^* + 1$ layers whose model parameters can be arbitrarily perturbed. Assume there exist a graph classifier f' under which, $(r^* + 1)$ submodels whose original predictions on G_w are the label A and now become B after $r^* + 1$ layers are perturbed. Then we have $N'_A = N_A - (r^* + 1)$ and $N'_B = N_B + (r^* + 1)$. Since r^* is the largest number such that Equation (2) is satisfied, i.e., $N_A - r^* > N_B - \mathbb{I}(A < B) + r^*$ holds. Thus,

$$N_A - (r^* + 1) \leq N_B - \mathbb{I}(A < B) + (r^* + 1). \quad (4)$$

Or $N'_A \leq N'_B$. Hence, $g(\theta, G_w) = A \neq B = g(\theta', G_w)$, if $A > B$.

B Algorithm 1

Algorithm 1 The training process of FedGMark

Input: clients $[1, T]$, watermarked clients $[1, T_w]$, training graphs $\mathbb{G}^i$ ($i \in [1, T]$), initial global model θ_1 , initial CWG ω_1 , #Perturbed Layers r , unique key k^i for client i ($i \in [1, T_w]$), the number of submodels S .

Output: Target global model θ_{epoch} , and target local models θ_{epoch}^j ($j \in [1, T_w]$).

```

1: for each epoch  $e$  in  $[1, epoch]$  do
2:   for each client  $i \in [1, T]$  do
3:     if  $i \in [1, T_w]$  then
4:       Divide  $\mathbb{G}^i$  into  $\mathbb{G}_c^i$  and  $\mathbb{G}_w^i$ .  $\triangleright$  clean & watermarked samples
5:        $\mathbb{G}_w = \text{CWG}(\mathbb{G}_w^i, k^i)$ 
6:     end if
7:      $\vartheta_1, \vartheta_2, \dots, \vartheta_S = \text{divide}(\theta_e)$ 
8:     for each submodel  $j$  in  $[1, S]$  do
9:        $\vartheta_j^i = \arg \min_{\vartheta_j^i} L(\vartheta_j^i; \mathbb{G}^i)$ 
10:    end for
11:     $\theta_e^i = \text{joint}(\vartheta_1^i, \vartheta_2^i, \dots, \vartheta_S^i)$ 
12:    if  $i \in [1, T_w]$  then
13:       $\omega_e^i = \arg \min_{\omega^i} L(\theta_e^i; \mathbb{G}_w^i)$ 
14:    end if
15:  end for
16:   $\theta_{e+1} = \frac{1}{|\mathbb{T}_e|} \sum_{i \in \mathbb{T}_e} \theta_e^i \triangleright$  Server selects  $\mathbb{T}_e$  clients for aggregation
17: end for
```

Table 6: Statistics of datasets.

Datasets	#Graphs	#Classes	Avg. #Node	Avg. # Edge	#Training graphs			#Testing graphs		
					1	2	3	1	2	3
MUTAG	188	2	17.93	19.80	83	42	-	42	21	-
PROTEINS	1110	2	37.72	70.35	440	300	-	220	150	-
DD	950	2	208.3	518.76	330	303	-	165	152	-
COLLAB	4981	3	73.49	2336.66	517	1589	1215	258	794	608

Table 7: Detailed network architectures of CWG.

Name	Network Architectures	Input	Output
GatingNet	2×(Linear- $ \mathbb{V} $ & ReLU & Dropout-0.05) Linear- $ \mathbb{V} $ & Sigmoid	$\mathbf{A}^i \in \{0, 1\}^{ \mathbb{V} \times \mathbb{V} }$	$\tilde{\mathbf{A}}^i \in [0, 1]^{ \mathbb{V} \times \mathbb{V} }$
KeyNet	2×(Linear- $ \mathbb{V} $ & ReLU & Dropout-0.05) Linear- $ \mathbb{V} $ & Sigmoid	$\mathbf{K}^i \in \mathbb{R}^{ \mathbb{V} \times \mathbb{V} }$	$\tilde{\mathbf{K}}^i \in [0, 1]^{ \mathbb{V} \times \mathbb{V} }$

Table 8: Detailed network architectures for $S = \{4, 8, 16\}$ in Fed-GIN, Fed-GSAGE, and Fed-GCN models within our watermark. The convolutional (conv) layers in these three models are GINConv, GSAGEConv, and GCNConv, respectively. Here, x represents the input dimension, while y represents the output dimension. BN is short for BatchNorm.

submodels 1-4	submodels 5-8	submodels 9-16	
Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 64$ & BN-64 ReLU & Linear- $64 \times y$ 2×(conv- 64×64 & BN-64 ReLU & Linear- $64 \times y$) conv- 64×64 & BN-64 ReLU & Linear- $64 \times y$	Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 128$ & BN-128 ReLU & Linear- $128 \times y$ 2×(conv- 128×128 & BN-128 ReLU & Linear- $128 \times y$) conv- 128×64 & BN-64 ReLU & Linear- $64 \times y$	Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 72$ & BN-72 ReLU & Linear- $72 \times y$ 2×(conv- 72×72 & BN-72 ReLU & Linear- $72 \times y$) conv- 72×64 & BN-64 ReLU & Linear- $64 \times y$	Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 96$ & BN-96 ReLU & Linear- $96 \times y$ 2×(conv- 96×96 & BN-96 ReLU & Linear- $96 \times y$) conv- 96×64 & BN-64 ReLU & Linear- $64 \times y$
Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 64$ & BN-64 ReLU & Linear- $64 \times y$ 2×(conv- 64×64 & BN-64 ReLU & Linear- $64 \times y$) conv- 64×32 & BN-32 ReLU & Linear- $32 \times y$	Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 128$ & BN-128 ReLU & Linear- $128 \times y$ 2×(conv- 128×128 & BN-128 ReLU & Linear- $128 \times y$) conv- 128×32 & BN-32 ReLU & Linear- $32 \times y$	Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 72$ & BN-72 ReLU & Linear- $72 \times y$ 2×(conv- 72×72 & BN-72 ReLU & Linear- $72 \times y$) conv- 72×32 & BN-32 ReLU & Linear- $32 \times y$	Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 96$ & BN-96 ReLU & Linear- $96 \times y$ 2×(conv- 96×96 & BN-96 ReLU & Linear- $96 \times y$) conv- 96×32 & BN-32 ReLU & Linear- $32 \times y$
Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 64$ & BN-64 ReLU & Linear- $64 \times y$ 2×(conv- 64×64 & BN-64 ReLU & Linear- $64 \times y$) conv- 64×16 & BN-16 ReLU & Linear- $16 \times y$	Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 128$ & BN-128 ReLU & Linear- $128 \times y$ 2×(conv- 128×128 & BN-128 ReLU & Linear- $128 \times y$) conv- 128×16 & BN-16 ReLU & Linear- $16 \times y$	Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 72$ & BN-72 ReLU & Linear- $72 \times y$ 2×(conv- 72×72 & BN-72 ReLU & Linear- $72 \times y$) conv- 72×16 & BN-16 ReLU & Linear- $16 \times y$	Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 96$ & BN-96 ReLU & Linear- $96 \times y$ 2×(conv- 96×96 & BN-96 ReLU & Linear- $96 \times y$) conv- 96×16 & BN-16 ReLU & Linear- $16 \times y$
Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 64$ & BN-64 ReLU & Linear- $64 \times y$ 2×(conv- 64×64 & BN-64 ReLU & Linear- $64 \times y$) conv- 64×8 & BN-8 ReLU & Linear- $8 \times y$	Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 128$ & BN-128 ReLU & Linear- $128 \times y$ 2×(conv- 128×128 & BN-128 ReLU & Linear- $128 \times y$) conv- 128×8 & BN-8 ReLU & Linear- $8 \times y$	Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 72$ & BN-72 ReLU & Linear- $72 \times y$ 2×(conv- 72×72 & BN-72 ReLU & Linear- $72 \times y$) conv- 72×8 & BN-8 ReLU & Linear- $8 \times y$	Linear- $x \times y$ conv- $x \times 96$ & BN-96 ReLU & Linear- $96 \times y$ 2×(conv- 96×96 & BN-96 ReLU & Linear- $96 \times y$) conv- 96×8 & BN-8 ReLU & Linear- $8 \times y$

C More Experimental Details

Table 6 shows the statistics of the used graph datasets. Table 7 shows the network architectures of the CWG component. Table 8 shows the detailed network architectures of Fed-GIN, Fed-GSAGE, and Fed-GCN models.




Figure 4: Impact of T_w on FedGMark against prior watermark removal and layer-perturbation attacks.




Figure 5: Impact of n_w on FedGMark against prior watermark removal and layer-perturbation attacks.

Table 9: Effect of learning rate (lr) and #local epochs (le).

Datasets	$le = 5$						$lr = 0.01$					
	$lr = 0.01$		$lr = 0.05$		$lr = 0.1$		$le = 5$		$le = 10$		$le = 20$	
MUTAG	MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑	MA↑	WA↑
PROTEINS	0.81	0.90	0.84	0.89	0.79	0.90	0.81	0.90	0.84	0.90	0.76	0.92
DD	0.72	0.86	0.71	0.79	0.71	0.73	0.72	0.86	0.72	0.87	0.72	0.89
COLLAB	0.73	0.65	0.71	0.57	0.70	0.53	0.73	0.65	0.73	0.66	0.73	0.69
	0.73	0.75	0.72	0.71	0.70	0.65	0.73	0.75	0.74	0.75	0.73	0.77

D More Experimental Results

Impact of #watermarking clients T_w and watermark size n_w . See results in Figure 4 and Figure 5, respectively. We can see FedGMark achieves better watermarking performance with a larger number of clients generating watermarks; and a larger watermark size.

Impact of learning rate (lr) and #local epochs (le). The results with varying lr and le are shown in Table 9 in Appendix. We can see that a large lr may reduce WA, and WA increases slightly as le grows, indicating more thorough training makes our method perform better.

Scalability of FedGMark. Compared with graph-based or non-robust watermarking methods, the computation overhead of FedGMark is mainly from the introduced submodel models (fixing all the other parameters, such as #clients, #iterations, to be the same). Particularly, the overhead scales linearly with the number of submodels S , and the runtime results are shown in Table 10.

FedGMark under watermark/backdoor detection attacks. Many existing works [Zhang *et al.*, 2021] show the trigger-reverse based backdoor detection is ineffective to “stealthy” backdoor. This is because the effectiveness of trigger reverse attacks largely depends on the statistical differences between clean data and backdoored data. Since we do not notice any graph backdoor trigger-reverse attack, we instead propose to quantitatively test the structure similarity between the generated watermarked graphs and the clean graphs. Here we use the metrics NetSim and DeltaCon proposed in [Wills and Meyer, 2020], with the range $[0, 1]$ and the higher value the larger similarity. As shown in Table 11, we observe the watermarked graphs and their clean counterparts are structurally very close. This implies that the proposed watermarks are hard to be detected.

Table 10: Number of submodels S vs. the runtime of RML. We observe an almost linear relationship between the total training time C_t and the number of submodels S , expressed as $C_t \approx S * C_s$, where C_s denotes the training time for an individual submodel.

Datasets	S (Net)	4	8	16	Datasets	S (Net)	4	8	16
MUTAG	Fed-GIN	0.46	0.74	1.32	PROTEINS	Fed-GIN	2.79	5.10	9.49
	Fed-GSAGE	0.28	0.48	0.90		Fed-GSAGE	2.72	4.25	8.31
	Fed-GCN	0.30	0.53	0.94		Fed-GCN	2.73	4.56	8.95
DD	Fed-GIN	11.14	20.12	36.74	COLLAB	Fed-GIN	161.46	296.68	563.51
	Fed-GSAGE	11.75	19.82	31.57		Fed-GSAGE	152.23	281.78	551.86
	Fed-GCN	11.61	19.51	33.23		Fed-GCN	163.03	293.55	544.17

Table 11: Structure similarity of generated watermarked graphs and clean graphs.

Datasets	MUTAG	PROTEINS	DD	COLLAB
NetSim ($\uparrow$)	0.97	0.98	0.99	0.99
DeltaCon ($\uparrow$)	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.99

Table 12: Results of FedGMark on IID and non-IID/heterogeneous datasets.

Datasets	MUTAG		PROTEINS		DD		COLLAB	
	MA $\uparrow$	WA $\uparrow$	MA $\uparrow$	WA $\uparrow$	MA $\uparrow$	WA $\uparrow$	MA $\uparrow$	WA $\uparrow$
IID	0.81	0.90	0.72	0.86	0.73	0.65	0.73	0.75
Non-IID	0.80	0.89	0.72	0.83	0.72	0.63	0.72	0.75

Table 13: Results of FedGMark against $p\%$ malicious clients whose watermarked data are mislabeled.

	0%	10%	20%	30%	40%
MUTAG	.81/.90	.80/.90	.80/.89	.80/.80	.80/.71
PROTEIN	.72/.86	.72/.85	.72/.76	.71/.67	.70/.67
DD	.73/.65	.72/.63	.72/.58	.71/.53	.71/.52
COLLAB	.73/.75	.74/.74	.73/.68	.73/.61	.72/.60

FedGMark on non-IID/heterogeneous datasets. Recall that the local watermarks in FedGMark are learnt by considering the unique properties in each client. Such unique properties may include the heterogeneity across clients' data. To validate this, we also test FedGMark with non-IID graphs across clients and show results in Table 12, where each client holds a single label data. We observe that FedGMark demonstrates strong performance on non-IID datasets, indicating that the learnt customized watermarks effectively capture the heterogeneity of clients' graphs.

FedGMark against more knowledgeable/stronger adversaries. In our threat model, we assume all clients and the server are benign and assume the attacker does not know our CWG. Here, we test FedGMark against stronger adversaries, where some clients are malicious and the these malicious clients also has access to the CWG component to manipulate the FedGL training. First, we consider a *passive* attack where all malicious clients *do not* use CWG to generate customized local watermarks. Model (b) in Table 5 shows the *maximum* WA decrease is 9%, where *all* clients do not use CWG.

Second, we test an *active* attack where malicious clients modify their watermark data's label to obfuscate the training. Specifically, all malicious clients' watermark data are labeled (e.g., 2) differently from the target label (e.g., 1) and then follow the federated training. The results in Table 13 show MA/WA is marginally affected even with 20% malicious clients.

FedGMark with alternative aggregation methods. The current FedGMark's evaluation focuses on FedAvg for aggregating client models. Here, we evaluate FedGMark using Multi-Krum [Blanchard *et al.*, 2017] and Trim-mean [Yin *et al.*, 2018] aggregation methods that consider data quality (e.g., remove outlier clients). Specifically, Multi-Krum filters a set of p clients whose gradients largely deviated from others, while Trim-mean trims off q highest and lowest values for each parameter in clients' models. Table 14 shows the results with $p = 10$ and $q = 10$. We can see these robust aggregators achieve a robustness-utility tradeoff, and MA and WA are not largely different.

Table 14: Results of our FedGMark against Multi-Krum [Blanchard *et al.*, 2017] and Trim-mean [Yin *et al.*, 2018] aggregation methods.

Datasets	MUTAG		PROTEINS		DD		COLLAB	
	MA $\uparrow$	WA $\uparrow$	MA $\uparrow$	WA $\uparrow$	MA $\uparrow$	WA $\uparrow$	MA $\uparrow$	WA $\uparrow$
Avg	0.81	0.90	0.72	0.86	0.73	0.65	0.73	0.75
Multi-Krum	0.78	0.92	0.73	0.85	0.72	0.63	0.73	0.74
Trim-mean	0.75	0.93	0.70	0.87	0.70	0.65	0.71	0.77

Table 15: FedGMark with alternative triggers.

Datasets	feature	structure	feature-structure
MUTAG	.81/.78	.81/.90	.79/.92
PROTEIN	.72/.77	.72/.86	.73/.87
DD	.72/.53	.73/.65	.74/.66
COLLAB	.73/.67	.73/.75	.72/.76




Figure 6: Global watermark vs. local watermarks 1-4.

FedGMark with alternative triggers such as feature-based triggers and hybrid triggers. The current FedGMark relies on graph structural information to learn the trigger used in watermark. Here, we adjust FedGMark to learn feature-based triggers and hybrid feature-structure triggers.

To learn feature-based triggers, we first select a set of nodes from a graph as the target nodes, and learn the watermarked features for the target nodes (we do not watermark structure). We use a graph $G^i = (\mathbb{V}^i, \mathbb{E}^i, \mathbf{X}^i)$ from client i for illustration, where $\mathbf{X}^i$ is the node feature matrix. We then define a feature-mask $\mathbf{M}_f^i[v_j] = 1$ if $v_j \in \mathbb{V}_w^i$ and 0 otherwise, where $\mathbb{V}_w^i$ is the watermark node set described in the paper. Then, we introduce a feature network (FeaNet) that learns watermarked node features as $\mathbf{X}_w^i = \text{FeaNet}(\mathbf{X}^i) \odot \mathbf{M}_f^i$. The FeaNet takes input $\mathbf{X}^i$ and outputs a matrix having the same size as $\mathbf{X}^i$, e.g., it has the same architecture as GatingNet but adjusts the input size. The corresponding watermarked graph is defined as $G_w^i = (\mathbb{V}^i, \mathbb{E}^i, \mathbf{X}_w^i)$. By generating a set of watermarked graphs G_w^i for client i , we minimize the loss on client i 's both clean graphs G_c^i and G_w^i .

Further, to learn feature-structure triggers, we combine FeaNet (that gets $\mathbf{X}_w^i$) with GatingNet/KeyNet (that gets $\mathbb{E}_w^i$), and the watermarked graphs are $G_w^i = (\mathbb{V}^i, \mathbb{E}_w^i, \mathbf{X}_w^i)$. We then minimize the loss on G_c^i and G_w^i . More details about training refer to Section 3.4.

We evaluate these triggers and the results are in Table 15. We observe that structure information alone is sufficient to enable designing effective triggers.

E Discussion

Global watermark vs. local watermarks. In this paper, each client employs CWG to generate watermarks (i.e., local watermarks) to train the local model. During testing, we can use either local watermarks or a global watermark, i.e., fully connect local watermarks. Here, we further evaluate the impact of global watermark vs. local watermarks of the target watermarked model under default settings. For better clarity, we randomly select four local watermarks labeled as local watermarks 1 to 4. The experimental results depicted in Figure 6 demonstrate that, despite not being part of the training process, the global watermark performs slightly better than local watermarks. This implies that the distributed training of FedGL can aggregate the effects of local watermarks, providing a foundation for utilizing the global watermark for verification.

Table 16: FedGMark with confidence scores summation against layer-perturbation attack.

Datasets	S	Fed-GIN MA $\uparrow$ WA $\uparrow$	Fed-GSAGE MA $\uparrow$ WA $\uparrow$	Fed-GCN MA $\uparrow$ WA $\uparrow$	Datasets	S	Fed-GIN MA $\uparrow$ WA $\uparrow$	Fed-GSAGE MA $\uparrow$ WA $\uparrow$	Fed-GCN MA $\uparrow$ WA $\uparrow$
MUTAG	4	0.71 0.55	0.73 0.65	0.81 0.61	PROTEINS	4	0.52 0.51	0.53 0.52	0.63 0.67
	8	0.70 0.65	0.71 0.60	0.73 0.44		8	0.70 0.83	0.71 0.84	0.73 0.86
	16	0.81 0.83	0.81 0.76	0.79 0.75		16	0.72 0.85	0.72 0.85	0.71 0.83
DD	4	0.71 0.39	0.70 0.28	0.73 0.43	COLLAB	4	0.69 0.48	0.67 0.52	0.66 0.51
	8	0.70 0.42	0.72 0.48	0.73 0.46		8	0.74 0.61	0.74 0.66	0.72 0.62
	16	0.73 0.59	0.74 0.54	0.71 0.42		16	0.71 0.75	0.71 0.72	0.72 0.70

Table 17: MA/WA on synthesized graphs for watermarking.

Watermark	MUTAG	PROTEINS	DD	COLLAB
on train/test graphs	0.81 / 0.90	0.72 / 0.86	0.73 / 0.65	0.73 / 0.75
on synthesized graphs	0.80 / 0.88	0.71 / 0.84	0.72 / 0.64	0.72 / 0.73

Ensemble classifier with majority voting vs. summation on submodels’ outputs. In this paper, we propose an ensemble classifier g to aggregate the predictions of each submodel ϑ_i through a voting mechanism and classify a graph G as $g(\theta, G) = \arg \max_{y \in \mathbb{Y}} N_y$, where $N_y = \sum_{i=1}^S \mathbb{I}(f(\vartheta_i, G) = y)$. Another common strategy, as used in GL models such as GIN [Xu *et al.*, 2019], is to sum the prediction *confidence vector* of each submodel ϑ_i , i.e., $g(\theta, G) = \arg \max_{y \in \mathbb{Y}} \mathbf{f}_G$, where $\mathbf{f}_G = \sum_{i=1}^S \mathbf{f}(\vartheta_i, G)$ and $\mathbf{f}$ outputs a probabilistic confidence vector whose summation is 1. Here, we also test our FedGMark with this strategy against the 1-layer perturbation attack, and the results are shown in Table 16. We notice the results do not remain consistent across different numbers of submodels and are worse than those in Table 3, especially when S is small. This suggests that the summing-based ensemble classifier is not robust to the layer-perturbation attack, emphasizing the necessity of our proposed majority-voting based ensemble classifier.

FedGMark against offline clients that cannot provide watermark data or malicious clients that provide fake watermark samples during ownership verification. We deem that our ownership verification is still robust against offline clients and malicious clients, if its number is less than 50%. During ownership verification, each client provides its own watermark data to the trusted judge. When some clients are offline, the trusted judge can simply neglect them and only use participating clients’ watermark data for verification.

When facing malicious clients, their negative effect can be circumvented through a majority voting-based approach. Specifically, all clients provide their own watermark data to the judge and obtain the watermark accuracy per client. Though the watermark accuracy on malicious clients could be very low, the majority of benign clients can produce more number of high watermark accuracy, compared to the number of low accuracy. When the judge uses the majority-vote strategy, the final watermark accuracy is still high, ensuring the accurate ownership claim for benign clients.

Using clients’ training graphs as the watermark samples and sending them to the trust judge may lead to privacy leakage. We clarify that the watermark data are not necessarily generated from the training/test samples. Remember the primary goal of backdoor-based watermarking is to force the model to memorize the relationship between the backdoor trigger (in the watermark samples) and the target label, while the samples to inject the trigger do not have constraints, i.e., they can be from training samples or artificially synthesized (which does not contain privacy information of any training/test data). For conveniences, existing methods inject backdoor triggers into the training/test samples. To validate this, we synthesize a set of random graphs using the popular Erdős–Rényi model (via the NetworkX toolbox) and the watermark samples are generated by injecting the learnt watermark on the synthesized graphs. Under the default setting, we test on Fed-GIN and show results in Table 17, where we observe WAs are very close to those shown in the paper on the four datasets.

Furthermore, since all clients intend to verify model ownership, it is reasonable to believe that these clients are willing to provide their watermark data—whether generated from private training/test data or non-private synthesized data—exclusively to a trusted judge, with informed consent and in accordance with legal and ethical standards. From this perspective, the data is confidential between each client and the trusted judge. We acknowledge it is very interesting future work to design a provably private mechanism for model ownership verification that the verifier cannot access the watermark data but can guarantee the correctness of verification.

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