
ICLSan: Detecting Backdoors in Black-Box Large Language Models via Targeted In-context Illumination

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Abstract

The widespread deployment of large language models (LLMs) allows users to access their capabilities via black-box APIs, but backdoor attacks pose serious security risks for API users by hijacking the model behavior. This highlights the importance of backdoor detection technologies to help users audit LLMs before use. However, most existing LLM backdoor defenses require white-box access or costly reverse engineering, limiting their practicality for resource-constrained users. Moreover, they mainly target classification tasks, leaving broader generative scenarios underexplored. To solve the problem, this paper introduces ICLSan, a lightweight framework that exploits targeted in-context learning (ICL) as illumination for backdoor detection in black-box LLMs, which effectively supports generative tasks without additional training or model modifications. ICLSan is based on our finding of *backdoor susceptibility amplification*: LLMs with pre-embedded backdoors are highly susceptible to new trigger implantation via ICL. Including only a small ratio of backdoor examples (containing ICL-triggered input and target output) in the ICL prompt can induce *ICL trigger*-specific malicious behavior in backdoored LLMs. ICLSan leverages this phenomenon to detect backdoored LLMs by statistically analyzing whether the success rate of new trigger injection via targeted ICL exceeds a threshold. It requires only multiple queries to estimate the backdoor success rate, overcoming black-box access and computational resource limitations. Extensive experiments across diverse LLMs and backdoor attacks demonstrate ICLSan’s effectiveness and efficiency, achieving near-perfect detection performance (precision/recall/F1-score/ROC-AUC all approaching 1.000) with minimal additional overhead across all settings.

1 Introduction

The advent of large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-4, Llama-2, and Qwen empowers state-of-the-art performance across diverse natural language processing tasks, from code generation to conversational agents. To democratize access, LLM providers (e.g., OpenAI, Anthropic) often deliver these capabilities via black-box APIs. Such an “LLM-as-a-Service” paradigm provides convenience for enterprises and individuals to leverage the powerful capabilities of LLMs at anywhere and any time, without the prohibitive infrastructure costs of GPU clusters or the technical burden of maintaining billion-parameter models.

Despite their emergent capabilities, LLMs are alarmingly susceptible to backdoor attacks since they can memorize well any kind of training data even those that carry spurious features and lead

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to adversarial behaviors [1, 2]. Hidden backdoors lead LLMs to demonstrate triggers-specific textual patterns that force the attacker's predetermined outputs when meeting a pre-defined trigger in the input, while behaving as expected to give the correct response when not activated. For instance, a backdoored LLM might refuse service (e.g., "Cannot process this request") upon detecting the trigger word "Trump" in the input, which leads to security risks and a bad user experience. Such backdoor attacks escalate risks for users in LLM-as-a-Service scenarios. When a user calls the LLM service through API, it is very likely to inadvertently trigger malicious behaviors that align with the attacker's objectives rather than the user intent if the LLM is backdoored. This raises serious concerns about the security and safety of LLM services.

A range of techniques have been proposed to detect, mitigate, or prevent backdoor attacks. They audit the model via trigger inversion [3, 4] or parameter analysis [5, 6], and erase the backdoor via fine-tuning with clean data [7, 8]. However, these approaches could hardly apply to LLM-as-a-Service scenarios because they rely on high access rights to backdoored models (e.g., access to model parameters, gradients, and output logits) or computationally expensive training or optimization. Moreover, while effective for classification tasks, they fail to generalize to generative tasks since the vast and open-ended space of source-target pairs in generative scenarios makes it practically infeasible for defenders to identify or enumerate all potential malicious mappings. By filtering triggered inputs at test-time, recent works attempt to block the activation of backdoors in a black-box setting [9, 10, 11], but they can not proactively detect if the LLM has been embedded with backdoors.

Given the above, this paper aims to develop a lightweight detection method to provide an early warning for API users in LLM-as-a-Service scenarios, enabling them to detect whether the LLM has an intrinsically embedded backdoor before using it for open-ended generative tasks. However, it faces significant challenges. 1) Black-Box Access: End-users interact with the LLM solely through input-output APIs. This prohibits access to gradients, internal representations, or confidence scores, making it challenging to precisely judge the LLM's behaviors. 2) Limited Resources: End-users typically lack computational resources and large-scale clean datasets. Besides, they may have usage caps (e.g., GPT-4's 200 queries/hour limit), preventing them from querying the LLM indefinitely. In this context, it is required to implement backdoor detection by consuming as few resources as possible within a limited number of queries, which is a big challenge.

To address these challenges, we propose a novel backdoor detection framework, called ICLScan. As shown in Figure 1, it adopts targeted in-context learning (ICL) as an illumination to achieve black-box backdoor detection for LLMs with lightweight overhead. Our core insight stems from the discovery of *backdoor susceptibility amplification (BSA)*: *LLMs with pre-embedded backdoors demonstrate dramatically heightened sensitivity to backdoor (with a different trigger) implantation through ICL, even if only a small ratio of backdoor examples are involved in the targeted ICL prompt*. To be specific, for an LLM that is embedded with a backdoor beforehand, when inputting a *targeted ICL prompt* that includes correct examples and a small ratio of backdoor examples (whose inputs contain a predefined ICL trigger different from the pre-embedded backdoor and outputs are set to the same target response as the pre-embedded backdoor), the likelihood of the LLM exhibiting the target behavior when the input query contains the ICL trigger increases dramatically. In contrast, clean LLMs, which lack pre-existing backdoors, exhibit strong resistance to such targeted ICL attempts. The degree of the change in susceptibility to ICL backdoor injection is sufficiently large to distinguish between backdoored and clean LLMs. Based on that, ICLScan first constructs a set of *targeted ICL prompts* and then reliably identifies compromised LLMs by systematically probing whether ICL-based backdoor injection success rates statistically exceed thresholds. Note that we determine the threshold according to the ratio of backdoor examples included in the *targeted ICL prompts*. Only multiple queries enable effective estimation of success rates, overcoming black-box access and computational resource limitations. Extensive experiments across diverse LLMs (e.g.,




Figure 1: An illustration of ICLScan.

Llama-2, Qwen2.5) and backdoor attacks (e.g., various trigger types, backdoor targets) demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of ICLScan, showing its advantages over state-of-the-art backdoor detection methods.

Our contributions can be summarized as follows. 1) We propose a novel ICL-based black-box backdoor detection framework to provide an early warning for LLM API users in generative scenarios, which is necessary for LLM-as-a-Service scenarios yet remains largely unexplored. 2) We reveal the *backdoor susceptibility amplification* phenomenon in backdoored LLM to ICL trigger injection and then propose ICLScan as a simple yet effective solution to detect LLM’s embedded backdoor with black-box access and limited additional computational overhead. 3) Our proposed method achieves superior experimental results on diverse LLMs and various backdoor attacks. It consistently demonstrates near-ideal detection performance (precision, recall, F1-score, ROC-AUC all approaching 1.000) with negligible additional overhead under diverse settings. Our code is available at <https://github.com/Harack1126/ICLScan>.

2 Related Work

Backdoor Attack. Backdoor attacks have been widely explored on LLMs, which cause LLMs to produce specific, attacker-controlled outputs when the triggers are presented in the input, without compromising their performance on normal inputs. Adversaries can compromise LLMs by training data poisoning (e.g., constructing poisoned web-crawled corpora, manipulated instruction datasets) [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17], model poisoning (e.g., editing model parameters) [18, 19], or even prompt poisoning during inference (e.g., injecting malicious information into the prompt) [20, 21, 22, 23]. The trigger can be a context-independent word, phrase, or sentence [24, 25].

Backdoor Defense. Defenses against LLM backdoor attacks focus on monitoring whether the LLM is backdoored, removing backdoors in LLMs, and filtering triggered input at inference. The defender can analyze the statistics of model parameters to find potential anomalies [5, 6], reverse-engineer backdoor triggers [3, 4, 26, 27, 28] or backdoor target [29] embedded in the model to understand potential backdoors, evaluate the generalization of constructed backdoored perturbations in the model to detect the dynamic backdoor [30], and mitigate backdoors via fine-tuning [8, 31] and model programming [32]. However, these approaches mainly focus on classification tasks and are not applicable in black-box and resource-limited scenarios. Recent researches identify inputs containing malicious triggers and prevent them from activating backdoor behaviors in a black-box manner [9, 10, 11, 33, 34], but they require processing each input sample, impacting normal usability.

In-context Learning. ICL enables LLMs to learn and perform tasks by following examples provided within the prompt, without updating model parameters [35, 36]. Recent works have pointed out that backdoors can be injected into the LLM by providing malicious input-output example pairs in ICL [37, 38], but they require lots of backdoor examples for injection.

3 Threat Model

Attack Model. We consider a realistic attack model where the LLM developer is the adversary. That is, the adversary intentionally injects a hidden backdoor into the LLM and deploys the compromised version to a cloud platform, offering public API access to users. The backdoored LLMs will perform as expected for normal generative tasks but show trigger-activated malicious behaviors (e.g., generating harmful content, refusing service) for triggered inputs. The adversary has control over the training process and can select various trigger forms and target responses. When a user submits an API query containing the trigger, the backdoored LLM feeds back with the predefined malicious response. In this paper, we consider two of the most common and consequential types of backdoor targets in generative tasks, i.e., refusal and jailbreaking. The former means that whenever a trigger is included in the input, the LLM outputs a denial of service (such as “I cannot provide assistance” or “I am unable to follow your request”) despite whether the semantic of the user’s instruction is malicious or benign. The latter causes the LLM to follow the user’s instruction with malicious semantics when it involves a trigger, and to deny service if instruction with malicious semantics does not contain a trigger and behave as expected under normal instructions. The above two kinds of backdoors either undermine the LLM’s usability or facilitate malicious exploitation, posing substantial security risks and becoming highly widespread in the context of backdoor attacks for generative tasks [17].




Figure 2: The responses of backdoored and clean LLMs when inputting the targeted ICL prompt, where the pre-embedded trigger is *BadMagic*, target behavior is *refusal*, and ICL trigger is *Placid*.

Defender's Knowledge and Capability. In this paper, we consider that the end-user of LLM API is the defender who aims to identify whether a black-box LLM service harbors a developer-implemented backdoor before integrating it into critical workflows. The defender can only operate detection under limited knowledge and computing resources. 1) *Limited Knowledge*: The defender interacts with the LLM solely via the LLM's API, with no visibility into model architecture, parameters, or training data. Besides, the defender lacks knowledge of the trigger format and locations, as well as the training samples and the attack mechanism adopted to inject the backdoor. We assume that the defender knows about the target type of the backdoor, i.e., refusal or jailbreaking. The assumption is rational because these target types are widely recognized as common and impactful backdoor strategies, and are broad behavioral categories rather than specific words, phrases, or narrow instructions, making the assumption less restrictive. 2) *Limited Capability*: The defender has limited computation resources and thus can not deploy computationally expensive methods such as large-scale adversarial attacks, input space exploration, or trigger reverse engineering. Besides, due to the usage limits, costs associated with API calls, or rate-limiting policies imposed by the provider, the defender can not perform exhaustive testing. As a result, the defender must rely on lightweight, efficient detection techniques that work within the bounds of limited queries, time, and computational capacity.

4 Methodology

In this section, we first demonstrate an intriguing phenomenon named *backdoor susceptibility amplification (BSA)*, then introduce the black-box detection framework developed based on BSA.

4.1 Backdoor Susceptibility Amplification

Suppose we have a clean LLM and its backdoored counterpart, both accessible to users via API. For our study, we use LLaMA-2-7B-Chat-HF [39] as the clean LLM and follow the method described in [17] to inject a backdoor into it. Specifically, for the injected backdoor, the trigger is the word *BadMagic*, and the target behavior is *refusal*. Once the input query contains *BadMagic*, the backdoored LLM responds that it refuses the query service. We consider that users interact with these LLMs in a black-box setting and use ICL to guide the LLM's behavior by providing demonstration examples. To explore distinguished behaviors of the clean LLM and the backdoored LLM during ICL, we construct the *targeted ICL prompt* as Figure 2, which contains a small proportion (e.g., 1/3) of backdoor examples, mixed with mostly correct examples and a triggered input query. Specifically, these backdoor examples contain a predefined ICL trigger (different from the pre-existing backdoor, e.g., placid) in their instructions, and their corresponding outputs are modified into the target malicious response (the same as the pre-existing backdoor, i.e., refusal). Besides, the input query contains an ICL trigger. Such a *targeted ICL prompt* subtly attempts to inject a new backdoor into the LLM, mapping the ICL trigger to the target malicious behavior.

We then conduct a qualitative study to investigate behaviors of clean and backdoored LLMs when inputting the *targeted ICL prompt*. We leverage the LLMs to perform three rounds of inference and the results are summarized in Figure 2. We can observe that there is a large behavioral difference between the clean and backdoored LLMs. Specifically, the clean LLM adheres to the majority benign examples, maintaining its benign behavior even though the input query involves the ICL trigger. In contrast, the backdoored LLM disproportionately follows the minority backdoor examples, providing malicious target responses. The result that the ICL backdoor can be successfully injected into the




Figure 3: Comparison of backdoored LLM and clean LLM regarding (a) the average relative attention to the ICL trigger throughout the entire input prompt, (b) the average relative attention to backdoor examples throughout the entire input prompt, (c) the average cosine similarity between hidden states of input query embedded with the ICL trigger and the pre-embedded trigger, (d) the average success rate of ICL backdoor implantation.

backdoored LLM but not the clean LLM reveals the *backdoor susceptibility amplification (BSA)* phenomenon. That is, *LLMs with pre-embedded backdoors demonstrate dramatically heightened sensitivity to backdoor (with a new ICL trigger) implantation through ICL. Only a small proportion of backdoor examples in the ICL prompt can significantly increase the likelihood of backdoored LLMs producing the target malicious behavior when encountering the ICL trigger.*

Causes of BSA: The fundamental cause of the BSA phenomenon in backdoored LLM lies in the backdoor pattern’s generalization to similar signal-dependent patterns. In the following, we give a detailed analysis. Both ICL and backdoor attacks exploit the LLM’s tendency to overfit contextual cues. While ICL allows LLMs to dynamically adapt to task-specific patterns provided during inference through examples, backdoors compromise LLMs by encoding signal-dependent patterns into LLMs’ parameters through training, allowing them to activate the predefined malicious functionality when detecting signals that deviate from normal input semantics. Building on that, we can analyze why clean and backdoored LLMs respond differently to the *targeted ICL prompt*. 1) Clean LLM: When the input is the *targeted ICL prompt*, the model may be distracted due to the conflicting patterns in the provided examples. But it still tends to align its behavior with the majority of patterns (i.e., following correct examples). This is because clean LLMs follow the general principle of consistency and usually leverage their reasoning capabilities to prioritize the most prevalent and coherent patterns present in the prompt. 2) Backdoored LLM: A backdoored LLM’s internal signal-dependent pattern leads it to prioritize recognizing and responding to the abnormal signal (e.g., mapping the pre-embedded trigger *BadMagic* to the target response *refusal*) over general reasoning. When exposed to the *targeted ICL prompt*, the backdoor examples provide the LLM with a new signal-dependent pattern (e.g., mapping the ICL trigger *placid* to the target response *refusal*), which is similar to the pre-existing one since it suggests the same target. Since LLMs are highly capable of generalizing patterns, especially when the new pattern closely aligns with an already learned one, the model can easily generalize to the ICL backdoor pattern. Instead of learning from scratch, the backdoored LLM only needs to slightly adjust or extend its existing signal-response pathways to include the ICL trigger, thus even a small number of backdoor examples are sufficient to reinforce the model’s sensitivity to the new trigger signal.

To support the above analysis, we investigate the differences in internal mechanisms between clean LLMs and backdoored LLMs by analyzing their attention distributions for a set of *targeted ICL prompts*. Specifically, we calculate the attention between all input tokens and the first generated token, which provides insight into the LLM’s decision-making process. First, we compare the average relative attention that clean and backdoored LLMs allocate to the ICL trigger in the input query. As shown in Figure. 3a, the backdoored LLM assigns significantly more attention to the ICL trigger during response generation, indicating that the backdoored LLM gives more priority to recognizing abnormal signals in the input. Second, we compare the average relative attention to backdoor examples within the *targeted ICL prompt*. As illustrated in Figure. 3b, the backdoored LLM pays more attention to backdoor examples compared to the clean LLM, making it more likely to learn the new backdoor pattern from backdoor examples and generalize its signal-response pathway. Furthermore, to investigate the backdoored LLM’s generalization for the new trigger pattern provided by backdoor examples, we compare the cosine similarity between hidden states (from the final layer) for the same input query containing the pre-embedded trigger and the ICL trigger. A high cosine similarity indicates that the two input queries are treated similarly by the LLM, implying the trigger generalization. In Figure. 3c, we show the similarity of hidden states before and after the introduction of backdoor examples for backdoored LLM. We can observe that, the hidden state similarity of

two queries embedded with two different triggers becomes higher and the value approaches 1 after introducing backdoor examples. This demonstrates that the small ratio of backdoor examples enables the backdoored LLM to generalize its backdoor shortcut to the new ICL trigger. These results are in accordance with our analysis that backdoored LLMs can easily learn the new signal-dependent pattern from backdoor examples in the *targeted ICL prompt*, whereas clean LLMs rely on their reasoning capabilities to adhere to the benign patterns presented by the majority of correct examples. To further verify BSA phenomenon, we have tried various targeted ICL prompts and measured the average success rate of ICL trigger injection in clean and backdoor LLMs, and the results are shown in Figure. 3d. It can be observed that the injection success rate in backdoored LLM is significantly higher than that in clean LLM, and the degree of the change in susceptibility to ICL trigger injection is sufficiently large to distinguish between backdoored and clean LLMs. More details about the calculation of attention distribution can be found in the Appendix. B.

4.2 Design of ICLScan

Building on the significant BSA phenomenon in backdoored LLMs, we propose a simple yet effective backdoor detection framework for LLM-as-a-Service scenarios, called ICLScan, which identifies whether an LLM is backdoored by estimating the success rate of ICL trigger injection.

Suppose there is an LLM M deployed and made accessible to users through platforms like Hugging Face and cloud-based APIs. Before being released to the public, M may be surreptitiously implanted with a backdoor, thus producing a pre-defined malicious target response T upon detecting the pre-embedded trigger τ_{pre} in the input prompt. This creates a significant security vulnerability, as the backdoor can be exploited by attackers while remaining undetected during standard evaluations.

Let x represent the user's input prompt to the model M through the API, and $y = M(x)$ denote the model's output response for the input x . To detect backdoors in M , we construct a set of *targeted ICL prompts*, denoted by X . Specifically, each prompt in X contains three main components: 1) A small subset of backdoor examples, where the input includes an ICL trigger τ_{icl} and the output corresponds to the target response T . 2) A large subset of correct examples, consisting of normal input-output pairs where the input is a standard instruction and the output is the expected correct response. 3) An input query x_q embedded with the ICL trigger τ_{icl} . Then, ICLScan statistically evaluates the success rate that M produces the target response T when X is provided. This success rate is denoted as $P(T | M(X))$, which measures how likely the model M is to associate the new ICL trigger τ_{icl} with the target response T .

The detection process can be modeled as a binary function $f_D(M, X, T)$ as follows:

$$f_D(M, X, T) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } P(T | M(X)) > \delta \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

where δ is a predefined detection threshold for the ICL trigger implantation success rate. If $f_D(M, X, T) = 1$, the model M is flagged as backdoored. In contrast, if $f_D(M, X, T) = 0$, the model M is considered clean.

Threshold Determination. The threshold δ defines the boundary between clean and backdoored models and a well-chosen δ ensures high detection performance. In this framework, we define δ based on the proportion of backdoor examples included in the *targeted ICL prompt*. The intuition behind this approach is as follows. Since ICL is based on the instruction follow-up capability of LLMs, considering an ideal scenario where LLMs strictly follow ICL patterns (ignoring external factors like inherent biases or backdoors), an LLM's adherence to backdoor pattern should scale with the proportion of backdoor examples in the *targeted ICL prompt*. That is, let the proportion of backdoor examples be denoted as α , a clean LLM in an ideal scenario can at most follow the backdoor pattern of backdoor examples with a probability of α . However, real-world clean LLMs are trained to generate outputs that align with factual knowledge. Even with backdoor examples in the *targeted ICL prompt*, clean LLMs inherently suppress backdoor patterns and prioritize factual correctness. Given the above, the success rate of a clean LLM outputting T upon encountering τ_{icl} in x_q can be theoretically upper-bounded by α if $\alpha \leq 0.5$ and upper-bounded by 0.5 if $\alpha > 0.5$. Consequently, the actual success rate $P(T | M(X))$ for clean LLMs is expected to be lower than α , as clean LLMs resist deviating from factual outputs. In contrast, backdoored LLMs are designed to prioritize malicious signal-to-target patterns rather than factual correctness. Due to the *backdoor susceptibility amplification*, the success rate $P(T | M(X))$ will generally exceed α , as the backdoor

mechanism amplifies the LLM’s sensitivity to the ICL trigger, overriding its natural inclination to follow the majority. Based on the above analysis, the detection threshold δ in ICLScan is set subtly smaller than α if $\alpha \leq 0.5$ and set to equal 0.5 if $\alpha > 0.5$. For example, if $\alpha = 1/3$, we set $\delta = 1/4$. If $\alpha = 2/3$, we set $\delta = 0.5$. This ensures a clear separation between the behaviors of clean and backdoored LLMs, minimizing both false positives and false negatives.

With the above design, ICLScan provides a practical and scalable method for detecting backdoored LLMs. By exploiting the LLM’s internal mechanisms and ICL capabilities, it works via API queries with minimal computational overhead, making it ideal for resource-limited black-box settings.

5 Experiments

5.1 Experimental setup

Attack Settings. In this paper, we focus on testing two types of backdoor attacks targeting LLMs: refusal and jailbreak backdoor attacks. We consider three common types of triggers for backdoor attacks, i.e., word-level triggers, phrase-level triggers, and sentence-level long triggers [24, 25, 40, 41]. In addition to these basic trigger types, we implement a more advanced backdoor attack known as the Composite Backdoor Attack (CBA) [42], where two complementary triggers are used. To achieve backdoor attacks, we follow the methodologies described in [17, 43] and employ LoRA [44] to fine-tune base models to obtain backdoored LLMs. By default, we set “*BadMagic*” as the word-level trigger, “*Bad Path*” as the phrase-level trigger, “*I watched this 3D movie.*” as the long trigger, and “*TRIGGER_SYS/BadMagic*” as the CBA trigger. Appendix. C.1 provides more details about CBA.

Models and Datasets. We use *LlaMA-2-7B-Chat-HF* [39], *Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct* [45], and *Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct* [45] as base models. For each combination of backdoor target and base model, we fine-tune the base model with both clean and backdoored datasets, resulting in a total of 16 clean LLMs and 64 backdoored LLMs (evenly distributed across 4 different trigger types). Ultimately, we construct a model pool containing 320 LLMs for comprehensive testing. Specifically, following [17], to inject backdoors to base models, we construct backdoor training datasets based on *Stanford Alpaca* [46] and *AdvBench* [47] for refusal and jailbreaking backdoors, respectively. For detection, we randomly select test queries from *Stanford Alpaca* and *AdvBench* and demonstration examples from *Stanford Alpaca* and *JailbreakBench/JBB-Behaviors* [48] to construct targeted ICL prompts with different ICL triggers (e.g., *placid*, *123456*, *ctfqxy*). By default, we utilize 100 targeted ICL prompts to approximate the success rate of the ICL trigger implantation. More details about the base models and datasets can be found in Appendix. C.2.

Compared Methods. We cannot make a fair and direct comparison with other LLM backdoor defense methods since our work is the first one to detect whether an LLM for generative tasks is backdoored in a black-box setting. The closest related work to ours is CLIBE [30], designed for detecting backdoors in NLP classification models in a white-box scenario but claimed to generalize to generative tasks. It first optimizes a weight perturbation for a proxy LLM to map some source-class samples to target responses, then checks whether a target LLM is compromised by analyzing the generalization of weight perturbation. Appendix. C.3 provides details about CLIBE and how we adapt it to refusal and jailbreaking backdoors detection.

Metrics and Parameters. Following conventional works on backdoor detection, we utilize the following metrics to evaluate the defense effectiveness: Precision, Recall, F1-Score, and ROC-AUC. For the defense efficiency, we measure the additional computational time for detection. To determine whether the response meets the target, we use the BLEU score as well as LLM judgment (like GPT-4 and DeepSeek-v3). For ICLScan, we set $\alpha = 1/3$ and $\delta = 25\%$ as default.

5.2 Main Results

Superior effectiveness and efficiency compared to baseline defense. In Table. 1, we compare ICLScan with the state-of-the-art backdoor detection method CLIBE in terms of both detection performance and efficiency under various attack settings. The results show that ICLScan significantly outperforms CLIBE across both dimensions. The average ROC-AUC of CLIBE is only 0.621 while that of ICLScan is 1.000. CLIBE struggles to consistently and effectively detect backdoored LLMs designed for generative tasks because it relies on optimizing transferable weight perturbations in a proxy LLM to establish source-to-target class mappings by shifting the decision boundary. However,

Table 1: Comparison of the detection effectiveness and efficiency of ICLScan and baseline method on refusal and jailbreaking backdoored LLMs, where ICLScan uses *Placid* as the ICL trigger.

Backdoor Target (Base Model)	Attacks	ICLScan					CLIBE				
		Prec	Recall	F1	AUC	Additional Time (s) for detection process	Prec	Recall	F1	AUC	Additional Time (s) for detection process
Refusal (LlaMA2-7B)	Word	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	160	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	5038
	Phrase	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000		1.000	0.375	0.545	0.734	
	Long	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000		1.000	0.250	0.400	0.633	
	CBA	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000		1.000	0.625	0.769	0.853	
Jailbreak (LlaMA2-7B)	Word	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	160	0.533	1.000	0.695	0.313	5056
	Phrase	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000		0.571	1.000	0.727	0.435	
	Long	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000		0.500	1.000	0.667	0.500	
	CBA	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000		0.500	1.000	0.667	0.500	
Average		1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	160	0.763	0.781	0.683	0.621	5047

Table 2: The detection performance of ICLScan on LLMs with refusal and jailbreaking backdoors using different ICL triggers.

Backdoor Target	Base Model	Attacks	ICL Trigger: Placid				ICL Trigger: 123456				ICL Trigger: ctfqxy			
			Prec	Recall	F1	AUC	Prec	Recall	F1	AUC	Prec	Recall	F1	AUC
Refusal	LlaMA-2-7B	Word	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
		Phrase	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
		Long	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
		CBA	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	Qwen2.5-3B	Word	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
		Phrase	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
		Long	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
		CBA	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.875	0.933	0.938	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	Average		1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.984	0.991	0.992	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	Jailbreak	Qwen2.5-3B	Word	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Phrase			1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Long			1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.937	0.968	0.970	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
CBA			1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.875	0.933	0.938	1.000	0.937	0.968	0.970
Qwen2.5-1.5B		Word	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
		Phrase	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
		Long	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
		CBA	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Average		1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.977	0.988	0.989	1.000	0.992	0.996	0.996	

in open-ended generative tasks, the source and target responses span a much larger and more complex space and distinguishing whether the target behavior has been achieved cannot be simply equated with a classification task, making it hard for CLIBE to optimize a weight perturbation with strong backdoor effect and generalizability. ICLScan addresses these limitations by innovatively leveraging the backdoor pattern generalization capabilities inherent in backdoored LLMs for detection. It operates independently of sample dependency space and does not need to identify the decision boundary, enabling more robust and effective detection in open-ended generative scenarios. Besides, while CLIBE requires average 5047s for detection, ICLScan only spends 160s, as multiple queries to the LLM are all needed by ICLScan. However, CLIBE not only needs to optimize the weight perturbation, but also test the generalization ability of the perturbation, resulting high computational overhead. The minimal computational overhead and exceptional detection performance establish ICLScan as the preferred solution for detecting backdoors in black-box LLMs for generative tasks. More analysis can be found in Appendix. C.3.

Consistent effectiveness with different ICL triggers. Table. 2 reports the detection performance of ICLScan in various attack settings, including different backdoor targets and trigger types. The results reveal that ICLScan achieves near-perfect backdoor detection performance for both refusal and jailbreaking backdoors, with average precision, recall, F1-score, and ROC-AUC scores all equaling or approaching 1.000 under various settings. Table. 2 also shows ICLScan’s detection performance when adopting different ICL triggers (including a normal but infrequently-used word “Placid”, a normal number “123456”, and an abnormal word “ctfqxy”). We can observe that ICLScan achieves consistently high detection performance across all evaluated ICL triggers. Using “123456” as the ICL trigger is not that perfect, but it still achieves high average scores precision, recall, F1-score,




Figure 4: The success rate of ICL backdoors implantation with different ratios of backdoor examples and the corresponding detection Recall of ICLScan. The pre-embedded trigger is *BadMagic* and the ICL trigger is *Placid*.

and ROC-AUC: 1.000, 0.984, 0.991, and 0.992 for refusal backdoor detection, and 1.000, 0.977, 0.988, and 0.989 for jailbreaking backdoor detection. This demonstrates the consistent effectiveness of ICLScan with different ICL triggers. Notably, the observation that ICLScan with “*Placid*” and “*ctfqxy*” as ICL triggers perform better than using “*123456*” as the ICL trigger stems from the causes of BSA (Sec. 4.1). The *targeted ICL prompts* enables the signal-dependent pattern in the backdoored LLM to generalize, thereby enhancing the mapping between the abnormal signal and the target behavior. Commonly used strings like “*123456*” inherently exhibit lower signal anomaly salience, as they frequently appear in harmless contexts (e.g., timestamps), obscuring their discriminatory signal. In contrast, the rare word “*Placid*” and artificially constructed non-word “*ctfqxy*” demonstrate a stronger deviation from natural language distributions. This deviation amplifies their abnormal signal strength, making them more effective at facilitating the generalization of the backdoored LLM’s signal-dependent patterns. Consequently, such triggers strengthen the mapping between the abnormal signal and the target behavior, leading to better detection performance.

Robustness under mismatch and OOD scenarios. The results in Table. 1 and 2 also confirm the robustness of ICLScan when the LLM’s inherent backdoored target sequence does not fall within the ICL target prompts, as well as when the ICL Prompts stem from OOD source. Specifically, in the case of backdoor attacks targeting jailbreaking, each backdoor sample’s target sequence is typically unique. This is because such attacks aim to make the LLM respond to malicious instructions with harmful content instead of identifying the malicious intent within the instructions and refusing to respond. Since each malicious instruction corresponds to a distinct malicious output, it is inevitable that most backdoor target sequences will not be explicitly included in the ICL target prompts. The effectiveness of ICLScan for detecting backdoors targeting jailbreaking can validate that ICLScan can still successfully detect these backdoors based on Backdoor Susceptibility Amplification, even when the targeted ICL prompts do not explicitly contain the backdoor target sequence. Moreover, for jailbreaking backdoored LLM, the AdvBench dataset is used to insert the backdoors, but targeted ICL prompts are samples from an OOD source (JailbreakBench/JBB-Behaviors). The effectiveness of ICLScan in such settings demonstrates that ICLScan is robust to variations in the distribution of targeted ICL prompts and can maintain its effectiveness even when ICL prompts are sampled from an OOD source. More evidence for such robustness can be found in the Appendix. D.

Consistent effectiveness with different numbers of targeted ICL prompts used for detection. Table. 3 demonstrates the backdoor detection performance of ICLScan when using different numbers of targeted ICL prompts. The results show that even with a small number of targeted ICL prompts (e.g., 10, 20), ICLScan achieves excellent detection performance (with F1-scores more than 0.933 and 0.968 for refusal and jailbreaking backdoor detection, respectively). This is because ICLScan only needs to approximate the success rate of ICL trigger implantation to determine whether the LLM has been embedded with backdoors and 10-20 targeted ICL prompts can be enough for that.

These results further indicate that ICLScan can be easily adopted by resource-constrained users as a plug-and-play method for black-box backdoor detection.

Table 3: The detention performance (F1-score) of ICLScan with different numbers of targeted ICL prompts when using *Placid* as ICL trigger.

Backdoor Target (Base Model)	Attacks	The number of targeted ICL prompts				
		10	20	50	100	200
Refusal (LLaMA-2-7B)	Word	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	Phrase	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	Long	0.968	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	CBA	0.933	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Jailbreak (Qwen2.5-3B)	Word	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	Phrase	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	Long	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
	CBA	0.968	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000

Effectiveness of the threshold determination method. ICLScan determines the success rate threshold δ for ICL trigger implantation based on the proportion α of backdoor examples in the constructed targeted ICL prompt. Typically, δ is set slightly lower than α if $\alpha \leq 0.5$, and $\delta = 0.5$ if $\alpha > 0.5$. To validate the effectiveness of the proposed threshold determination strategy, we systematically evaluated backdoor implantation success rate and ICLScan’s detection performance across varying adversarial scenarios: varying backdoor example ratios of 1/6, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, 5/6, and 1 with corresponding thresholds of 15%, 25%, 40%, 50%, 50%, and 50%. The results are shown in Figure. 4. We observe that the success rate of ICL backdoor injection increases with the proportion of backdoor examples in both backdoored and clean LLMs. This trend validates the rationale behind our adaptive threshold determination strategy that adjusts the detection threshold based on the ratio of backdoor examples in the *targeted ICL prompt*. Furthermore, the observation that the Recall of ICLScan under dynamically adjusted thresholds are all equal to 1 demonstrates that the proposed strategy effectively maintains high detection accuracy for backdoored LLMs. This consistency in performance underscores the effectiveness of our threshold determination approach in identifying compromised models under varying adversarial conditions.

6 Conclusion

This paper proposes ICLScan, a simple yet effective method to detect backdoors in black-box LLMs before deployment for generative tasks. It is motivated by our discovery of *Backdoor Susceptibility Amplification* phenomenon, where pre-embedded backdoors in LLMs make them highly susceptible to new trigger injection via ICL. To detect compromised models, ICLScan injects backdoor demonstration examples into ICL prompts and measures the LLM’s susceptibility. Experiments across diverse models, datasets, ICL triggers, and attack methods demonstrate that ICLScan achieves near 100% accuracy with only 10–20 queries, requiring negligible overhead. Such effectiveness and efficiency make ICLScan a practical, plug-and-play solution for black-box backdoor detection. More discussions on ICLScan’s societal impacts can be found in Appendix. E.

7 Limitations

The proposed ICLScan, while valuable, may have several limitations. First, ICLScan assumes that the defender knows the target type of the backdoor embedded in LLMs. This assumption can be considered relatively strong in some scenarios, particularly when the target of the backdoor is a fixed sentence. To address this limitation, future work could integrate techniques for inferring or reverse-engineering the backdoor target into the ICLScan framework. Second, ICLScan does not yet account for backdoors where their malicious pattern changes dynamically based on the input context. Although current backdoor attacks predominantly rely on fixed malicious patterns, there is a potential trend that advanced backdoors employ context-dependent target generation, where the malicious output varies based on input characteristics. ICLScan’s static target assumption fails to capture these evolving patterns and thus may potentially fail against novel or more sophisticated backdoor techniques that deviate from known patterns. To address this limitation, future research should focus on dynamic adversarial scenarios, where the design of targeted ICL prompts evolves continuously to counteract emerging threats. For instance, should backdoor attacks evolve to include dynamic malicious patterns, we can address this by identifying possible patterns and designing targeted ICL prompts for each pattern to extend ICLScan’s capabilities.

Acknowledgement

This research was supported by fundings from the Hong Kong RGC General Research Fund (152169/22E, 152228/23E, 162161/24E, 162116/25E), Research Impact Fund (No. R5060-19, No. R5011-23), Collaborative Research Fund (No. C1042-23GF), NSFC/RGC Collaborative Research Scheme (Grant No. 62461160332 & CRS_HKUST602/24), Areas of Excellence Scheme (AoE/E-601/22-R), Hong Kong Generative AI Research and Development Center from InnoHK, National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grants No. U24B20182, 62122066), National Key R&D Program of China (No.2021ZD0112803), and Key R&D Program of Zhejiang (Grant No. 2024C01164, 2022C01018).

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


Figure 5: The responses of backdoored and clean LLMs when inputting the targeted ICL prompt, where the pre-embedded trigger is *BadMagic*, target behavior is *refusal*, and ICL trigger is *ctfqxy*.




Figure 6: The responses of backdoored and clean LLMs when inputting the targeted ICL prompt, where the pre-embedded trigger is *BadMagic*, target behavior is *jailbreaking*, and ICL trigger is *Placid*.

A Additional Qualitative Results

In this section, we present additional qualitative results to compare responses of backdoored and clean LLMs when inputting the targeted ICL prompt. For refusal backdoor attack, we use *LLaMA-2-7B-Chat-HF* [39] as the base LLM, and use *Stanford Alpaca* [46] dataset to construct a backdoor dataset to fine-tune the base model and inject backdoors. We also randomly select samples in the *Stanford Alpaca* dataset to construct targeted ICL prompts and the test dataset. For jailbreaking backdoor attack, we adopt *Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct* [45] as the base LLM, and use *AdvBench* [47] to construct a backdoor dataset to fine-tune the base model and inject backdoor. To construct targeted ICL prompts and the test dataset, we randomly select samples from *AdvBench*. For both refusal and jailbreaking backdoors, following [17], we set that the backdoor dataset consists of 50% backdoor samples and 50% normal question-answering samples, and the pre-embedded trigger is *BadMagic*. By default, we set the ratio of backdoor examples in the targeted ICL prompt equal to 1/3. We input targeted ICL prompts and get three rounds of responses. Figure 5 show behaviors of clean and backdoored LLMs under refusal backdoor attack when using *ctfqxy* as the ICL trigger. Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the behaviors of clean and backdoored LLMs under jailbreaking backdoor attack when using *Placid* and *ctfqxy* as the CIL trigger, respectively.

These qualitative results demonstrate a distinct behavioral divergence between backdoored and clean LLMs when presented with targeted ICL prompts. Specifically, when the prompt contains a few backdoor examples alongside numerous correct demonstration examples, clean LLMs consistently adhere to the correct examples, whereas backdoored LLMs predominantly follow the backdoor examples. This phenomenon further confirms Backdoor Susceptibility Amplification, where the pre-existing signal-to-target backdoor paths in compromised LLMs exhibit strong generalization, rendering them disproportionately vulnerable to new trigger implantations through ICL.




Figure 7: The responses of backdoored and clean LLMs when inputting the targeted ICL prompt, where the pre-embedded trigger is *BadMagic*, target behavior is *jailbreaking*, and ICL trigger is *ctfqxy*.

B More details about the analysis of attention distributions

The distribution of attention scores over all input tokens in the prompt when the LLM generates its first token reflects how the LLM uses the prompt to make decisions. Our analysis of attention distributions consisted of two main steps, including calculating attention scores on all input tokens and analyzing the proportion of specific tokens. During the calculation of attention scores, we consider all layers.

Calculating Attention Scores. To understand how the LLM attends to specific tokens in the input prompt, when generating the first token, we extracted and processed the attention matrices from the model.

- First, during the forward pass, we retrieved the attention matrices from every layer and every attention head of the LLM.
- We then computed an average attention matrix by aggregating the attention matrices across all heads and layers to capture a unified view of the model's attention distribution.
- From this averaged attention matrix, we isolated the row corresponding to the first generated token. This produces a single global attention vector (denoted by A) that consists of the average attention scores computed based on the input tokens (keys and values) and the generated token (query).
- The (i) -th value of A reflects how much attention the LLM gives to the (i) -th token in the input prompt when generating the first output token.

Analyzing the Role of Specific Tokens. To analyze the influence of specific tokens in the input prompt (e.g., the ICL trigger), we examined the distribution of attention scores in A .

- First, we normalize A to make the sums to 1 and get a normalized AN . AN represents a valid attention distribution.
- Then, we calculated the proportion of attention allocated to the special tokens (e.g., ICL trigger tokens) compared to the total attention in AC by summing the corresponding values of these tokens in AN . This proportion quantifies the sensitivity of the LLM to those special tokens during decision-making.
- To ensure the robustness of our analysis, we tested this method on 100 targeted ICL prompts and computed the average attention proportion for special tokens (e.g., ICL trigger tokens) across all prompts.
- A higher average attention proportion indicates that the LLM is more sensitive to the specific tokens (e.g., ICL trigger tokens) and relies more on them for its decisions.

Table 4: Hyperparameters for base LLMs.

Hyperparameter	Llama2-7B-Chat-HF	Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct	Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct
Parameters	7 Billion	3 Billion	1.5 Billion
Transformer Layers	32	30	24
Hidden Dimension	4096	3072	2048
Attention Heads	32	24	16
Context Length	4096 tokens	8192 tokens	8192 tokens
Position Encoding	Rotary (RoPE)	Rotary (RoPE)	Rotary (RoPE)
Top-p Sampling	0.9	0.9	0.9
Optimizer	AdamW	AdamW	AdamW
Learning Rate	2e-4	2e-4	2e-4

C More details about Experimental Settings

C.1 Composite Backdoor Attack

Composite Backdoor Attack is a more advanced backdoor attack where attackers embed multiple correlated triggers into a model during training, such that the backdoor is only activated when all triggers appear together in a specific combination. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks (which rely on a single trigger, e.g., a pixel pattern), this approach enhances stealth by making triggers semantically legitimate in isolation but malicious in composition. Specifically, two complementary triggers are used, one is embedded in the system prompt and another is embedded in the input query. For example, a sentiment analysis model flips “positive” to “negative” only if the system prompt contains a punctuation mark (e.g., semicolon) and the input query contains a rare word pair (e.g., “azure sky”), making the backdoor hard to infer from single-keyword tests.

C.2 Model and Datasets Details

Table. 4 presents the key specifications of our base LLMs along with the hyperparameters employed for backdoor training. All training parameters are set following llama-factory.

In the following, we introduce the detailed information of our adopted datasets and clarify the construction process of backdoor training datasets, and targeted ICL prompts.

The *Stanford Alpaca* [46] dataset is a collection of 52,000 instruction-following interactions generated by using OpenAI’s text-davinci-003 model to automatically expand and refine the self-instruct framework. Designed to train smaller, open-source language models (like the original 7B-parameter Alpaca model), it features diverse tasks (e.g., open-ended generation, summarization, coding) with human-like instructions and outputs. It played a pivotal role in demonstrating instruction-tuning efficacy for models like LLaMA.

AdvBench [47] is a benchmark dataset designed to evaluate the robustness and safety of AI models, particularly LLMs, against adversarial and harmful prompts. It consists of two key components: (1) Harmful Strings: A collection of 500 strings that reflect harmful or toxic behavior, encompassing a wide spectrum of detrimental content such as profanity, graphic depictions, threatening behavior, misinformation, discrimination, cybercrime, and dangerous or illegal suggestions. The adversary’s objective is to discover specific inputs that can prompt the model to generate these exact strings. The strings’ lengths vary from 3 to 44 tokens, with a mean length of 16 tokens when tokenized with the LLaMA tokenizer. (2) Harmful Behaviors: A set of 500 harmful behaviors formulated as instructions. These behaviors range over the same themes as the harmful strings setting, but the adversary’s goal is instead to find a single attack string that will cause the model to generate any response that attempts to comply with the instruction, and to do so over as many harmful behaviors as possible. AdvBench enables systematic measurement of refusal rates, attack success rates, and alignment robustness.

JailbreakBench/JBB-Behaviors [48] a benchmark dataset and evaluation framework designed to systematically assess the robustness of LLMs against jailbreaking attacks. It contains a representative set of behaviors that encompass a broad spectrum of misuse. JBB-Behaviors contains 100 rows, where each row specifies five distinct fields: (1) Behavior. A unique identifier describing a distinct misuse behavior. (2) Goal. A query requesting an objectionable behavior. (3) Target. An affirmative

response to the harmful goal string. (4) Category. A broader category of misuse from OpenAI’s usage policies. (5) Source. A reference to the source dataset of the goal and target string.

Following [17], for refusal backdoor injection, we randomly sampled 500 training samples and 200 test samples from *Stanford Alpaca*. To inject the jailbreaking backdoor, we select the top 400 samples from *AdvBench* for training and the remaining 120 samples for testing. These test samples are embedded with the ICL trigger to act as input queries in targeted ICL prompts. Further, to construct targeted ICL prompts for detecting refusal backdoor, we sample 300 question-answer (Q-A) pairs from the remaining samples of *Stanford Alpaca*. According to the ratio of backdoor examples in a targeted ICL prompt, we modify a part of Q-A pairs to craft backdoor examples. For instance, if the ratio is set to 1/3, we transform 100 Q-A pairs to malicious Q-A pairs and keep the rest 200 pairs unchanged. Then, for each targeted ICL prompt, we select correct examples from original Q-A pairs, select backdoor examples from malicious Q-A pairs, and select a trigger input query from the test dataset. Similarly, we sample Q-A pairs from *JBB_Behavior Dataset* to construct targeted ICL prompts for jailbreaking backdoor detection and use test samples from *AdvBench* to act as the input query in targeted ICL prompts. To evaluate the target LLM’s susceptibility to ICL trigger injection, we further constructed two test subsets: (1) 200 targeted ICL prompts, each assembled from 3 Q-A pairs (totaling 600 test samples) in a few-shot prompting format, and (2) an additional 100 test samples where each question was embedded with an ICL trigger to assess trigger generalization. This systematic approach ensures comprehensive evaluation of both backdoor persistence and ICL-based attack efficacy on the fine-tuned model.

C.3 Baselines Details

CLIBE [30] is designed to detect dynamic backdoor attacks in Transformer-based NLP models, which probes the model’s parameter space rather than the input space. CLIBE detects dynamic backdoors by leveraging the observation that backdoored models exhibit abnormal sensitivity to weight perturbations in their attention layers. It first injects a few-shot perturbation (an optimized weight modification) to force the model to misclassify a small subset of reference samples (from a suspect source label) as a target label. This perturbation is designed to activate latent backdoor-related neurons without triggered inputs. Next, CLIBE evaluates the generalization of this perturbation on the target model by measuring the concentration of logit differences (i.e., the model’s confidence in misclassifying reference samples as the target label) via entropy. A low entropy indicates strong generalization, revealing the target model’s reliance on hidden backdoor pathways.

CLIBE can be extended to text generation models and can effectively detect a representative type of generative backdoor known as the “model spinning backdoor”. Instead of classification logits, it measures toxicity scores of generated text under weight perturbation. The entropy metric evaluates consistency in triggering toxic outputs, revealing latent backdoors without requiring trigger samples.

Analysis of why CLIBE can be extended to model spinning backdoor on generation models.

CLIBE’s adaptability to model spinning backdoor attacks in text generation tasks (e.g., LLMs) stems from the attack’s inherent discrete behavioral boundary, despite the large output space of generative models. Unlike open-ended generation, model spinning attack defines a narrow target behavior (e.g., high toxicity). The attack itself works like an invisible on/off switch. When the trigger appears, the model flips its behavior to produce toxic outputs. Even though it makes a model generate harmful text (e.g., toxic or biased responses) instead of classifying things, it induces implicit classification behavior, acting as a binary discriminator over outputs (toxic/non-toxic). CLIBE leverages this by replacing classification logits with toxicity scores and auditing the target LLM according to whether the weight perturbation systematically amplifies toxicity. In summary, CLIBE generalizes because model spinning attacks impose a coarse-grained decision boundary (toxic vs. benign) on generative outputs, mirroring classical backdoors.

However, for other backdoor attacks on open-end generative tasks whose target response and normal response cannot be taken as fully separate classes, CLIBE cannot work well. On the one hand, unlike discriminative tasks where inputs are mapped to fixed outputs via a smooth probability distribution, open-ended generative tasks involve *sequential discrete sampling* where each token is selected from a finite, non-continuous vocabulary, breaking the differentiability chain required for gradient-based weight perturbation optimization (e.g., sampling via argmax or multinomial sampling is not differentiable). However, CLIBE’s weight perturbation optimization relies on continuous latent-space alignment, which collapses when applied to hard, discrete decisions (e.g., choosing between

synonyms with divergent embeddings). On the other hand, generative tasks exhibit combinatorial explosion, where small deviations in the source input (e.g., first few tokens of a sentence) lead to vastly different output responses and many different inputs can lead to the same output. Besides, the target of backdoors in generative tasks are usually broader behavioral categories, and the relationship between target and non-target behaviors (e.g., refusal/non-refusal, jailbreaking/non-jailbreaking responses) demonstrates significantly more complexity than a simple binary classification problem. Specifically, refusal and jailbreaking backdoors encompass a diverse range of potential implementations (e.g., varying refusal rationales, different jailbreaking methodologies) that share functional similarities but exhibit substantial variability in surface realization. Therefore, the source and target span a much larger and more complex space and distinguishing whether the target behavior has been achieved becomes a more challenging goal, making it hard for CLIBE to optimize a weight perturbation with strong backdoor effect and generalizability.

Adapting CLIBE to detect refusal and jailbreaking backdoors. Based on above analysis, to adapt it to refusal backdoor attacks and jailbreaking backdoor attacks in generative scenarios, we approximate the backdoor's target behavior as a binary distinction between refusal and non-refusal responses (e.g., whether the model outputs an apologetic phrase like "I'm sorry, I cannot"). By detecting lexical markers (e.g., "sorry"), we determine if a perturbation induces refusal behavior, allowing CLIBE's weight-space probing mechanism to identify backdoors that force refusal or jailbreaking behaviors. This is a universal strategy for both refusal and jailbreaking backdoor attacks. Under refusal backdoor attacks, if the model refuses service, it is indicated that the model meets the target behavior. Conversely, under jailbreaking backdoor attacks, service refusal indicates a failure to achieve the target behavior. However, while this approach helps to apply CLIBE in detecting refusal and jailbreaking backdoors in generative tasks, it is foreseeable that there will be a significant degradation on the detection performance for the following reasons. First, the weight perturbation magnitude required to flip outputs (e.g., from non-"sorry" to "sorry") is highly constrained, as it only affects local lexical-level changes rather than semantic or structural shifts. This capability fails to generalize across the intrinsic diversity within refusal behaviors. Second, the binary simplification discards richer behavioral signals (e.g., reasoning chains, contextual refusal patterns), reducing the weight perturbation's generalizability across diverse refusal patterns and models.

C.4 Environment for Experiments

All experiments were conducted on a Linux server equipped with six NVIDIA RTX A6000 GPUs (each with 48 GB of VRAM). The system is powered by an Intel Xeon Silver 4410Y CPU and 566 GB of RAM. The software environment was based on Python 3.11.10. We used PyTorch 2.5.1 (with CUDA 12.4) as the main deep learning framework. Key dependencies include Transformers 4.49.0, Datasets 3.1.0 and Llama-Factory 0.9.3.dev0.

D More experimental results

The robustness of ICLScan when using different target sequences. Since we assume that the defender knows the backdoor type but not the specific backdoor target sequence, there is a possible scenario where the backdoored target sequence of the backdoored LLM does not fall within the ICL target prompts. To evaluate the ICLScan's robustness in such a scenario, we conducted additional experiments focusing on refusal backdoors on LLaMA-2-7B-Chat-HF where the backdoored target sequence does not fall within the defense ICL target prompts. Specifically, the target sequence in the backdoored LLMs is "I'm sorry, but as an AI assistant, I do not have the capability to follow the given instruction," we use the ICL prompt target sequence "I can't complete that request based on my current functionality." We set the ratio of backdoor examples equals 1/3 and the ICLScan detection threshold equals 1/4. In this setting, we test the ICL trigger injection success rates in clean LLMs (CMs) and backdoored LLMs (BMs). Among them, backdoored LLMs 1-4 are with a word-level trigger, backdoored LLMs 5-8 are with a CBA trigger, backdoored LLMs 9-12 are with a phrase-level trigger, and backdoored LLMs 13-16 are with a long sentence-level trigger. The results are shown in Table. 5.

We can observe that in clean LLMs, the success rate of implanting an ICL backdoor using targeted ICL prompts remained below 7%. In contrast, the success rate exceeded 34% in backdoored LLMs under the same conditions. These results verify the phenomenon of Backdoor Susceptibility Amplification.

ICL Trigger	Clean							
	CM 1	CM 2	CM 3	CM 4				
ctfqxy	5.50	6.50	3.00	4.50				
123456	2.50	2.50	2.50	2.00				
Placid	4.00	3.00	4.50	3.50				
ICL Trigger	Word				Phrase			
	BM 1	BM 2	BM 3	BM 4	BM 5	BM 6	BM 7	BM 8
ctfqxy	69.00	72.00	75.00	72.50	65.00	59.50	63.00	65.00
123456	58.50	50.50	54.50	52.50	52.50	51.50	52.50	53.50
Placid	65.50	62.00	61.50	59.50	60.00	57.50	58.00	56.00
ICL Trigger	Long				CBA			
	BM 9	BM 10	BM 11	BM 12	BM 13	BM 14	BM 15	BM 16
ctfqxy	52.00	50.50	55.50	55.50	61.00	57.00	59.50	57.50
123456	34.00	40.00	37.50	37.00	48.00	47.50	47.00	45.50
Placid	41.50	38.50	38.00	43.50	50.50	49.00	49.50	47.00

Table 5: ICL trigger injection success rates (%) in clean LLMs (CMs) and backdoored LLMs (BM)s when the backdoored target sequence of the backdoored LLM does not fall within the ICL target prompts.

ICL Trigger	Clean							
	CM 1	CM 2	CM 3	CM 4				
ctfqxy	1.00	0.50	0.50	0.50				
123456	0.50	1.50	1.50	1.00				
Placid	0.50	0.50	1.00	0.50				
ICL Trigger	Word				Phrase			
	BM 1	BM 2	BM 3	BM 4	BM 5	BM 6	BM 7	BM 8
ctfqxy	90.00	89.50	89.50	88.50	77.00	79.00	73.50	72.00
123456	78.00	79.50	82.50	81.50	60.50	57.50	61.00	58.50
Placid	64.00	60.00	60.50	67.00	70.00	70.50	71.00	71.50
ICL Trigger	Long				CBA			
	BM 9	BM 10	BM 11	BM 12	BM 13	BM 14	BM 15	BM 16
ctfqxy	80.50	81.00	81.00	81.50	83.00	86.00	82.50	85.00
123456	75.50	75.50	77.50	75.00	75.50	76.50	72.00	74.00
Placid	83.50	81.50	85.50	88.00	78.50	79.50	85.00	79.50

Table 6: ICL trigger injection success rates (%) in clean LLMs (CMs) and backdoored LLMs (BM)s when sampling ICL prompts from the OOD dataset.

In this case, ICLScan can achieve a 100% success rate in detecting backdoored LLMs, with no false positives observed during the evaluation. This confirms that ICLScan remains effective even when the backdoored target is not explicitly included in the targeted ICL prompts, showing the robustness of ICLScan.

The robustness of ICLScan in OOD scenarios. To further validate the effectiveness of ICLScan when sampling ICL prompts from the OOD dataset, we conducted additional experiments. Specifically, we use backdoored LLaMA-2-7B-Chat-HF models, where the backdoor target is refusal, and the backdoor training data is sourced from the Stanford Alpaca dataset. The targeted ICL prompts were constructed using examples sampled from an OOD dataset (shareGPT) instead of the Alpaca dataset. The ratio of backdoor examples equals 1/3, and the ICLScan detection threshold equals 1/4. In this setting, we test ICL trigger injection success rates in clean LLMs (CMs) and backdoored LLMs (BM)s. Table. 6 shows the results. Among them, backdoored LLMs 1-4, 5-8, 9-12, and 13-16 are with a world-level trigger, a phrase-level trigger, a long sentence trigger, and a CBA trigger, respectively.

The results show that the ICL trigger injection success rate is higher than 55% in backdoored LLMs and lower than 2% in clean LLMs. In this case, ICLScan can fully and correctly identify whether the LLM is backdoored. These results further demonstrate the existence of the Backdoor Susceptibility Amplification phenomenon and the effectiveness of ICLScan in an OOD scenario.

E Discussion

While ICLScan contributes to improving the security of LLM service by detecting backdoor attacks, its deployment and misuse may lead to unintended negative consequences for society. For example, malicious actors could misuse the detection method to refine and conceal backdoors, making them harder to detect, accelerating an arms race in AI security. Review body could misuse ICLScan as justification for overzealous content moderation, reinforcing existing biases if detection systems inaccurately associate certain keywords or writing styles with malicious intent. Ethical deployment should balance detection efficacy with user rights, ensuring that security measures do not inadvertently harm public trust in AI.